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TAKE LESSONS FROM A TRUE MASTER OF THE GAME— WITH VIDEO TAPES

Zhu-Jiu Jiang, 9 dan, is one of the world's top Go players. He wants to share his vision of the game with western players and has recorded a number of videos. Here is a unique opportunity to learn how a professional thinks about Go. In each of these instructional videos, Zhu-Jiu Jiang will share his thoughts with you. Soon you will start to see the game in a different light, one that will allow you to advance in strength. All tapes are in English.

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❑ **Diagonal Opening** (GV11) When Black wants a fighting game, he should play this opening. White usually plays the starpoints, but can play 3-3 or 3-4. Discusses the major josekis that arise. A good companion to tapes 13 and 14 where this opening appeared in play.

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❑ **Handicap Workbook** (GV06). Provides diagrams for each of the approximately 90 problems posed during the lessons. Use the workbook to allow for more time for study, to jot down your answers, or to take notes. Large format with one diagram per page.

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❑ **Jiang vs Takemiya** (GV09). 1988 Ing Cup. One of the classic Takemiya big moyo games. This tape focuses on the two most important elements of large scale games: how to reduce the moyo and how to turn the moyo into territory.

❑ **Jiang vs Kato** (GV10). 1987 China-Japan Cup. How to use thickness to attack large groups. How to count when there is a large exchange of territories in the game.

❑ **Jiang vs Kobayashi** (GV12). 1985 China-Japan Cup. Kobayashi's style is very clear since each move is intended to make profit. Kobayashi doesn't like fighting, so Jiang tries to provoke a fight.

❑ **Jiang vs Awaji** (GV13). 1984 China-Japan Cup.

Awaji (with black) chooses a diagonal fuseki since he likes fighting. Game features lots of invasions.

❑ **Jiang vs Ishida** (GV14). 1985 China-Japan Cup.

Diagonal fuseki on 3-4 points. There is lots of fighting. The influence of 2 black walls is erased in a white win.

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Cover: Kibi and the Chinese Minister Playing Go. An oban print by Kunisada (signing as Toyokuni III), published in 1849-53. The print is titled *Go* in the upper right corner and was evidently intended for part of a 'Four Accomplishments' set. (From the Ishi Press Collection)

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Go World News

News From Japan

Rin loses the Tengen title to Ryu

In *Go World* 71, we presented a commentary by Ryu Shikun 6-dan on a game between Cho Chikun and his compatriot Lee Chang-ho. Ryu tried to beg off from doing that commentary on the grounds that he wasn't qualified to comment on the moves of such great players. That humility can now be taken with a grain of salt. Ryu startled the go world not only by becoming the challenger for the 20th Tengen title held by Rin Kaiho, but also by defeating Rin in the title match by a score of 3-1. Perhaps this result should not have been surprising, because Ryu had the best winning record in Japan tournaments in 1994: 43 games won against only 9 losses. Moreover, since entering the professional ranks in 1988 he has racked up 252 wins against 73 losses for a phenomenal 77.55% winning record. He also takes his place in the record books as the lowest-ranked player ever to win a top-seven title.

The title match began on November 2 with Ryu (playing Black) winning the first game by 3 1/2 points. Rin (Black) took the second game by a margin of 4 1/2 points, evening up the series, but Ryu came back to take the third game by forcing Rin to resign after 161 moves. In the fourth game played on December 8, Ryu, playing White, again forced Rin to resign after 202 moves.

We will undoubtedly be hearing more from this young Korean player who has decided to make his career in Japan. Rin now has only one title left, the Gosei, which he won by defeating Kobayashi Koichi last summer (reported on pages 21 to 24 in this issue).

Cho unseats Kato to become the 42nd Oza.

After 18 years, Cho Chikun finally won back the Oza title by defeating Kato Masao 3-2 in the title match that began on October 21, 1994. Kato started out badly on White by resigning the first game after only 145 moves. However, he came back strong and forced Cho



The end of the first game of the 19th Tengen title match. Having held the Tengen title for five years in a row, Rin probably thought this challenge from a lowly 6-dan could easily be rebuffed. Ryu had a surprise for him.

to resign both the second and third games, taking the lead in the series and putting Cho at *kadoban*. Strange as it may seem, this might not have been a good omen for Kato. Cho is notorious for coming from behind to win title matches. Moreover, he doesn't lose many of the title matches he challenges for. Sure enough, Cho lived up to his double reputation by winning the fourth game by 4 1/2 points, then two weeks later, on December 8, he won the fifth game playing Black by forcing Kato to resign after 197 moves.

With this triumph, Cho now holds three of the top seven Japanese titles (Kisei, Honinbo, and Oza). On the other hand, Kato, who has held the Oza title for a total of 11 terms (eight them consecutively from 1982 to 1989), is left without a top-seven title. Ironically, Kato had the most wins (39 wins to 11 losses) among professionals rated 7-dan and above in 1994. As this illustrates, in Japanese tournament go, you can win nearly all your games, but if you lose the crucial ones you miss out on the titles.

Kobayashi Satoru challenges Cho for the Kisei title.

Kobayashi Satoru won the right to challenge Cho Chikun for the 19th Kisei title by defeating Kobayashi Koichi in a best-of-three play-off. Before this success, Satoru's biggest tournament triumphs were winning 1990 IBM Lightning Go Tournament and challenging Kobayashi Koichi for the Gosei title from 1990 to 1992. He was rebuffed each time, the first time by the lopsided score of 3-0, but the second time by a respectable score of 3-2. In his third challenge, he lost 3-1. In this fourth match with Koichi, Satoru lost the first game by only half a point, but he went on to win the second game by 7 1/2 points and, in the final game, forced Koichi to resign after 168 moves.

It has become customary with some of the big Japanese title matches over the last few years for the first game to be held outside of Japan. This year the first Kisei game was held at the Atlanta Nikko Hotel in Atlanta, Georgia on January 18-19. Cho, playing Black, won convincingly, forcing Kobayashi to resign after 159 moves. In the second game, however, Cho misread a fight and resigned after 69 moves. This is only the second time that a two-day

game has finished in one day. In the 34th Honinbo title match, played in 1979, Kato lost the second game on the first day. However, that was his only loss in the series (see GW15).

We will present a full report on this title match in the next issue.

Late news: Cho, playing Black, won the third game by capturing a large group.

Judan Challenger: Yoda or Morita?

The tournament to decide the challenger for the 33rd Judan title has come down to two players: Morita Michihiro 7-dan, the winner of the winner's section, and Yoda Norimoto 9-dan, the winner of the loser's section. The two will face off on February 9 to decide who will challenge Otake Hideo, the holder of the title.

Morita is a new face who did quite well last year with a record of 35 wins to 12 losses. In winning the main Judan tournament, he overcame such big guns as Kobayashi Koichi Meijin and Kato Masao Oza.

Yoda has been a promising player for over a decade now. At the age of 29 (he will be 30 on February 11), he is a bit overdue for making a challenge for a top title. In setting himself up for a shot at becoming the Judan challenger, Yoda disposed of some powerful players: Cho Chikun, Takemiya Masaki, and O Rissei. He was eventually bumped out of the main tournament by Kato Masao, who was then disposed of by Morita and Cho Chikun. In the final of the losers' tournament, Yoda beat Cho for the second time in this tournament.

Whoever becomes the challenger to Otake, the debut of a player from the 'new generation' as challenger promises to make the upcoming Judan title match an interesting one.

Late news: Yoda, playing White, became the challenger by forcing Morita to resign.

The 50th Honinbo league

With more than half of the games already played in the Honinbo league, Kato Masao 9-dan has a slight edge to become the challenger for the title with four wins to one loss. Close on his heels, however, with three wins against one loss are Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan and Yo Kagen 7-dan, a promising 25-year-old player from Taiwan. Yo won his first three games, but he was finally stopped in the fourth round by Komatsu Hideki 8-dan. Unfortunately for

50th Honinbo League. Title holder: Cho Chikun: as of 95/2/14

Rank		Ka	Ya	O	Kom	Kob	Kato	Yuki	Yo	Won	Lost
1	Kataoka Satoshi		○		○	○	●			3	1
2	Yamashiro Hiroshi	●		○				●	●	1	3
3	O Rissei		●			○	●	○	●	2	3
4	Komatsu Hideki	●				●	●		○	1	3
5	Kobayashi Koichi	●		●	○		●			1	3
5	Kato Masao	○		○	○	○		●		4	1
5	Yuki Satoshi		○	●			○		●	2	2
5	Yo Kagen		○	○	●			○		3	1

Komatsu, he already has three losses, so not only is he out of the running to become the Honinbo challenger, he could even be eliminated from the league. Kobayashi Koichi Meijin is not doing very well either. With one win against three losses, he also could lose his place in the league.

Yo, the unheralded player of this league, came to Japan in 1982 and became a disciple of Oeda Yusuke 9-dan. He made shodan in 1985 and has steadily worked his way up the dan ranks, reaching 7-dan in 1994. His younger brother, Yo Kaei 5-dan, is also a professional player at the Nihon Ki-in.

The make-up of this year's Honinbo league is much different than it has been in the past. Not only are there many new faces, but two of the players, Yo and O Rissei, are Taiwanese,

reflecting the internationalization of the Japanese tournament scene. Of the 'old guard' who have dominated Japanese go for the last 20 years, only Kobayashi Koichi and Kato Masao are represented. These two players are now in their 40's. Of the other players, three are in their 30's (Kataoka, O Rissei, and Yamashiro) and three are in their 20's (Komatsu, Yo, and Yuki). It is only a matter of time before one of these younger players gets a shot at the title.

The 20th Meijin league

The 20th Meijin league is just getting under way. Unlike the Honinbo league, this league is still dominated by the 'old guard', represented here by Rin Kaiho, Cho Chikun, Kato Masao, and Takemiya Masaki. Two of the

20th Meijin League. Title Holder: Kobayashi Koichi: as of 95/2/14

Rank		Rin	Cho	Kato	Kata	Take	Awa	O	O	Yuki	Won	Lost
1	Rin Kaiho				○		○		○		3	0
2	Cho Chikun			○					○		2	0
3	Kato Masao		●				○				1	1
4	Kataoka Satoshi	●					○				1	1
5	Takemiya Masaki							●		○	1	1
6	Awaji Shuzo	●		●	●						0	3
7	O Rissei					○					1	0
7	O Meien	●	●								0	2
7	Yuki Satoshi					●					0	1



Ma Xiaochun triumphs over Kobayashi Koichi in the 1994 Japan–China Meijin match.

other players, Kataoka Satoshi and Awaji Shuzo, have made several appearances in both the Honinbo and the Meijin leagues. In 1989 Awaji became the Meijin challenger and in 1984 he was the Honinbo challenger.

Two Taiwanese players, O Rissei and O Meien, are playing in this league — O Rissei for the first time, which is a little surprising for a player of his ability, and O Meien for the second (he made his debut in the 11th league). Joining them, also for the first time in this league, is Yuki Satoshi 8-dan, a promising a 23-year-old player from the Kansai Ki-in who is also playing in the Honinbo league. Yuki also played in last year's Judan tournament, where he beat both Rin Kaiho and O Rissei.

Although it is too early to make any predictions, both Rin Kaiho and Cho Chikun, who ended the previous league tied for first place and had to hold a play-off to decide last year's challenger for the title, have gotten off to good starts. Rin has already won his first three games and Cho his first two.

News from China

Ma defends the Mingren title.

The 7th Mingren (Meijin) title match was held from October 24 to November 9. Ma

Xiaochun 9-dan, who has held this title since 1988, had a hard fight in rebuffing the 17-year-old challenger, Luo Xiho 5-dan. However, Ma finally prevailed by winning the best-of-five match by a score of 3–2.

News from Korea

Two new promotions

The anomaly of Korea's top player being only a 6-dan has been partially redressed: Lee Chang-ho is now a 7-dan. Korea also now has her ninth 9-dan with the promotion of Yang Jaeho. Yang won the 1st Tong Yang Securities Cup before it became a large-scale international tournament.

Lee's conscription update

In our last issue we mentioned that there was a possibility that Lee Chang-ho would be drafted. Lee did several weeks of basic training, after which he 'serves' at the Korean Ki-in. Is this some kind of face-saving compromise to avoid having Korean go lose its main star?

Lee defends the Kuksoo title

Lee Chang-ho defeated challenger Cho Hun-hyun in the 38th Kuksoo title match by a score of 3–2. The final was held on October 22,

1994 and ended after 11:00 p.m. with a half point victory for Lee. Lee has now held this title for three years in a row.

Lee defends the Kukgi title

Lee Chang-ho defended the 17th Kukgi (National Championship) title against Kim 3-dan in a best-of-five title match. Kim won the first game, but Lee came back to win the next three games and keep the title for the second year in a row.

International Go

The Tong Yang Securities Cup quarter-finals

The quarterfinals of the 6th Tong Yang Securities Cup were played on November 14 at the Hilton Hotel in Seoul. The results: Cho Hun-hyun beat Qian Yuping, Yamashiro beat Yoo Chang-hyeok, Nie Weiping beat Yoda Norimoto, and Ma Xiaochun beat O Rissei. The semifinals are scheduled to be played on March 30.

The 3rd Jinro Cup

This Korean tournament is officially known as The Jinro Cup: The SBS World Championship. It is sponsored by a new Korean TV channel, SBS, and the rice-wine distiller Jinro. The tournament consists of three teams from Korea, Japan, and China.

The tournament started out with Liu Zhing 5-dan of China taking out Yoo Chang-hyeok 6-dan of Korea. Then Miyazawa Goro 9-dan of Japan beat Liu and took out another Chinese player as well as two Korean players, one of whom was Seo Bong-soo, the holder of the 2nd Ing Cup. Miyazawa finally fell to Cao Dayuan 9-dan of China, but Cao immediately hit the dust when he met his next opponent, the formidable Lee Chang-ho of Korea. Lee then preceded to dispose of powerhouses like China's Ma Xiaochun 9-dan and Takemiya of Japan. Lee was eventually stopped by Nie Weiping, China's legendary 'iron goalkeeper', but not before he had beaten four opponents, thus matching Miyazawa's efforts. In the 12th round, held on January 16 at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo, Nie disposed of Japan's Kato Masao.

The 13th and 14th rounds will be held later this year. Nie's next opponent is Korea's Cho

Hun-hyun, and whoever comes out of that round will face Rin Kaiho, who is representing Japan. The question everyone is asking: will Nie be able to live up to his reputation as China's goalkeeper?

The Japan-China Meijin Playoff

Every year since the Chinese Mingren title was established in 1988, the Japanese Meijin and the Chinese Meijin have faced off in a best-of-three match. Because both Kobayashi Koichi and Ma Xiaochun have monopolized this title in their countries since 1988, this has turned into a yearly match between Kobayashi and Ma. In their first four encounters, from 1988 to 1991, Kobayashi dominated by winning eight straight games. Then in 1992 Ma won his first match against Kobayashi with two wins to one loss. In 1993, Kobayashi won the match by a score of 2-1.

The 1994 Japan-China Meijin match was held on three days from December 10 to 13 in Tokyo. Kobayashi lost the first game by resignation, but in the next game he forced Ma to resign. Kobayashi finally lost the series when he made a blunder on the 107th move in the third game.

China Wins the 9th Super Go

In the last issue we reported that Yamashiro Hiroshi of Japan had evened the score to 3-3 on August 1 in the 9th Japan-China Super Go. But Yamashiro's next opponent, Cao Dayuan 9-dan, defeated him by 2 1/2 points in round 7 and went on to beat Kataoka Satoshi in round 8. Finally, in round 9, held on January 24, Cao defeated Kato Masao by 2 1/2 points to give China her fifth Super Go victory against Japan's four. This year's victory was so decisive, that China didn't even have to use its two superstars Ma Xiaochun and Nie Weiping.

Rui Naiwei wins the First Bohae Cup: The Woman's World Champion

The Bohae Cup is a new tournament to determine the woman's world champion. It is sponsored by the Korean brewery company Bohae with a prize of \$30,000 to the winner.

The first and second rounds of the first Bohae Cup were played on November 23-24, 1994 in Seoul. Sixteen women professionals

from Korea, Japan, China, Hong Kong and the USA joined the first round of this knockout tournament: six from Korea, four from Japan, four from China, one from Hong and one from the USA. Janice Kim, the contestant from the USA, three Japanese and three Korean players as well as the contestant from Hong Kong, were eliminated in the first round. After the second round, only Kato Tomoko, Japan's Woman's Honinbo in 1993, along with three Chinese players, one of whom was Rui Naiwei 9-dan who has been living in Japan for the last three years, were left.

In the third round, held on December 21, 1994, Rui Naiwei defeated Kato Tomoko and Feng Yun beat her compatriot Yang Hui.

In the final, a best-of-three match held on January 23, 24, and 25, Rui Naiwei defeated Feng Yun by a score of 2-1.

In spite of her triumph, Rui had a rough time in this tournament. In the first round, she had a lost game to Japan's Nishida Terumi, but fought back to eventually win. Then in the play-off for the championship with Feng Yun, Rui was completely defeated in the first game and again had to fight back from a lost position to win the second game. In the third and final game, Feng played well in the opening but made a mistake in the middle game. Rui immediately took advantage of it to take the

lead. Although her performance was not as sterling as most people expected, by overcoming temporary setbacks, Rui proved that she has the tenacity and fighting spirit of a true world champion.

A brief report on the final game is given on page 8.

Obituary

John E. Williams (1908-1994)

With the death of John E. Williams, a major figure, not only in Canadian go but for Ishi Press as well, has passed from the scene. John Williams was an investor in Ishi Press and he contributed the seed money to start Go World. Without his generous assistance, this magazine would never have seen the light of day. He was one of the founders of the Canadian Go Association and supported it generously throughout the years.

He learned about go in the late 1930's when he came across a chess book by Edward Lasker which had a description of the game in the last chapter. He bought the book, but read only the chapter on go. From that time on, he 'became totally hooked on go.'

John Williams lived a full life. He studied at various universities, worked in many countries, traveled the world, and was fluent in several languages. He was an avid sportsman, had an interest in mathematics, puzzles, cards, and he especially loved games.

He retired from his own successful business 20 years ago and pursued his many hobbies in a leisurely country lifestyle, until he suffered a massive stroke in March, 1994. He had a final stroke on October 27, 1994. He will be missed by all those in Ishi Press, his many go friends in Japan, in Canada, and in the rest of the world.



Rui Naiwei: the world's strongest woman go player

Rui Naiwei Wins the Woman's World Championship

Rui Naiwei demonstrated once again that she is the strongest woman in the world by winning the first Bohae Cup. This was the second world championship that Rui has won. The first one was The Cui Bao Cup held in Beijing in December, 1993 which we reported on in *Go World* 70.

This game received wide coverage in the Korean media. It was broadcast live on KBS television with Seo Bong-soo giving the commentary. The prize for first place was \$30,000, but Feng had to be content with only \$7,000 for second place.

Game Three

White: Rui Naiwei 9-dan

Black: Feng Yun 7-dan

Played in Seoul on January 25, 1995

Figure 1 (1-64)

Up to Black 33, the moves were identical to the second game. In the second game Black 35 was played at A. According to Cho Hun-hyun, Black 45 at B would have been better. However, he thought that Feng was playing well.





Figure 1 (1-64) 56: connects at 49

Figure 2 (65-214)

Black 87 was the losing move. Black 1 in the reference diagram is the correct way for Black to make shape. After the moves to White

10, it is not clear which side is ahead. In the game, Black lost several stones at the top when White played 88 and 90.



Reference Diagram

After White invaded the top with 114, the game turned clearly in White's favor. The loss of the black group on the right was probably a mistake on the part of Feng.

White wins by resignation after move 214.

(Go Weekly, February 7, 1995.)




Figure 3 (65-214)

84: at 77; 111: at 104; 108: takes ko at 150; 205: takes above 174

A Commemoration of Dr. Yang Liansheng's Contribution to Goe Rules, Part Two

by Ing Chang-Ki

Since the publication of *An Investigation on the Evolution of the Counting Method of Wei-ch'i* by Dr. Yang, the Taiwanese *Wei-ch'i* magazine published the article three times. The chief editor, Sha Jiguan, also wrote in the July issue, 1966 a few provocative articles stating that the 'Goe rules have to be amended' and 'such wrongful practice should not be allowed to continue.'

Goe was invented by the Chinese. For this the Chinese are proud to relate with gusto. However, the Goe rules that we had adopted were the questionable 'Goe Rules' of the Japanese Nihon Ki-in (as anyone with the slightest knowledge of Goe would agree).

The *American Go Journal* also criticized these rules as unreasonable. They abandon traditional Goe principles and attempt to distort the rules to suit reality. Goe has been gaining popularity and has become an international game of competition. Unfortunately, our international friends only know 'Go', but not 'Goe'. This was due to a poor job in promoting Goe on the part of the Chinese. We only have ourselves to blame. In 1960, I wrote an article called *The Standard of Scoring in Wei-Chi*. At that time I suggested 'counting stones as the principle, comparing vacant points for practice' (similar to what we have discussed here). Three years after its publication, the Nihon Ki-in said it would announce its new rules. Three more years passed, there was no indication that new rules would be introduced officially. The difficulty of correcting the false traditional concept in Japan can clearly be seen. As for the Chinese Goe Association, we think we are duty bound to correct the rules that we had been practicing. No more counting scores differently according to who moves last. The standard rules for counting stones should not require compensation (for making the last move). Although this movement resulted in the dual system of counting scores, it was necessary to distinguish right from wrong.

Through debates, the advantages of the system arrived at by correct reasoning will prevail. Intelligent international friends should be able to pick the right set of rules. Anyway, the practice of ridiculous Goe rules based on sick theories should not be allowed to persevere.

The Chinese Goe Association was established in 1952. Most members failed to renew their membership fees after the first year. Also, since the inaugural meeting, no other was held. In 1972, I initiated a program and raised more than three million (Taiwanese) dollars from industry to support the association and it was officially incorporated. At that time I was the chief executive. The chairman was Zhou Zhirou, with Chen Xueping and Lin Boshou as the co-vice chairmen. We bought a flat in Taipei, on Renai Road 4th section, No. 37-26, 2nd floor. Chairman Zhou sighed, 'Finally, after 20 years, the Chinese Goe Association has it's own property!' A year later an agreement was reached with the *Xinsheng News* to hold the annual Mingren Tournament. This is already the 18th year of the tournament (at the time this article was written). It is the oldest tournament and possibly the one with the longest history in China. Because of the Mingren Tournament, a set of written rules for Goe were necessary. In 1953, the Chinese Goe Association adopted the Goe rules of the Nihon Ki-in of Japan. In a span of almost ten years, Sha Jiguan published a number of articles in the magazine *Wei-Chi* criticizing those adopted Goe rules and insisted that they be modified, and that we could not afford to follow the wrong path. Back then, I was a layman in Goe rules. I never seriously analyzed the rules myself. I asked Sha Jiguan to deliver all the papers that he had published to me. This would allow me to thoroughly understand the rules before making any necessary changes. Sha Jiguan lived very close to my house, within a 5-minute walking distance. Twenty minutes after I called, Mr. Sha delivered all his

papers to me. I spent the whole night studying the rules and realized that they must be amended. Sha only proposed to amend one of the rules as follow. The stone-counting method should not require half a point compensation if Black moves last. The side with more than 180.5 points wins, i.e., it is no longer required to match the score by the method of 'comparing vacant points'.

To satisfy the needs of the Mingren Tournament, the Goe Association published the *New Wei-ch'i Rules* in October 1974. We distributed these new rules to various Goe organizations throughout the world, asking for feedback. I also traveled to Tokyo to visit the Nihon Ki-in and held a meeting with experts in the rules and Goe, requesting their opinions. They included Go Seigen, Rin Kaiho, Hayashi Yutaka, Mihori Sho, Fujita Goro and Murakami Akira. Among them, only Mihori held the rules in high esteem and attempted to introduce them to the Japanese by publishing them in *Kido* and *Igo Club*, the professional Japanese Goe magazines. He thought the summary of the rules, 'breathless stones are removed; recurrence of board position is prohibited; stones and spaces are both territory; all stones are filled in to count', explained the rules clearly. There were no better rules than these. I also received another long letter (8 to 9 pages) from the President of the Massachusetts Go Club of the US, Mr. William F. Mann. He made a detailed analysis of the rules summary. In short, he said, 1) 'breathless stones are removed' is definitive — there is no better definition; 2) 'recurrence of the board position is prohibited' seems simple and attractive, but it is problematic and he did not agree; 3) 'stones and spaces are both territory' is the best definition for scoring — it is reasonable and precise, and cannot go wrong; 4) 'all stones are filled in to count' is a scientific method — it leaves the board position unchanged and gives the score at a glance without arithmetic. However, he thought the last rule was only my fantasy, and he was afraid that I might never succeed in my lifetime. Playing the game for more than 20 years, Mr. Mann said he had never come across a set of stones with exactly 180 each of black and white stones in any Go club. 'This was impossible, thus "all stones are filled in to

count" is only an impractical dream,' he said. This letter was published in the *American Go Journal*.

Mr. Katsumoto Tesshu, a Japanese Go writer read about the new Goe rules in the Goe magazines and agreed with the contents of the rules. He believed that these rules were more advanced than those of the Japanese rules. However, he still had a few questions about the rules. Around 1978, Mr. Katsumoto called me at the Chinese Wei-ch'i Association and asked me to set aside a special day for him in answering his questions. If possible, he said he wanted to make an appointment in advance. I told him that I would be more than happy to meet with him. Mr. Katsumoto was true to his words and he showed up at my house at nine in the morning. We talked until 11:00 p.m. When I walked him out the front door, he emphasized three points: 1) the new rules are indeed more advanced than the Japanese rules of comparing vacant points — in particular, it is much easier to teach beginners and children to determine life and death by capturing, instead of by adjudication; 2) although these rules are better than the Japanese rules, one must not try to promote them in Japan — professional players are stubborn with preconditioned minds; they will not accept new ideas; 3) the only practical way of promoting these rules is by holding the biggest tournament with the richest prize; this will capture the attention of Goe fans and lead to the adoption of these new rules — this would be the most direct and effective method. His advice prompted the birth of the First Ing Cup International Goe Tournament in 1988.

In 1977 we traveled to Seoul to hold the annual Chinese-Korean High School Goe tournament. When this tournament took place in Taipei in 1976, it was agreed by both parties that the New Chinese Goe Rules would be used. At the same time, a written agreement was signed that the same rules would be used the following year in Seoul. However, if within one year, the Koreans would discover shortcomings in these rules and inform us in writing, the Korean rules would be used instead, after verification of the defects by the Chinese. Actually, the Koreans didn't have their own rules. They merely adopted the

Japanese rules. In the following year, the same tournament took place at the Korean Baduk (Goe) Institute in Seoul. That night, the Koreans came to our quarters and demanded that the Korean rules be used instead of the New Chinese Goe rules because of the bureaucracy, and they hope that we would understand. We insisted what was stated in the written agreement signed the year before and noted that the Koreans had failed to protest against the rules during the entire year. (It was a special agreement, and it should have had nothing to do with the bureaucracy.) The fact was that the Korean team of 1976 (which came to Taipei) consisted of members of the 'Central News', and the team which hosted the 1977 tournament were from the Korean Baduk Institute. As the personnel changed, the written agreement was no longer honored. The following day, I reluctantly attended the tournament with a heavy heart. After returning to Taipei, I held a meeting and officially renamed the 'New Chinese Goe Rules' as the SST Rules to avoid future bureaucratic problems in international tournaments.


The 'New Chinese Goe Rules' were formulated in 1974. After three years, they were renamed the 'SST Rules'. In these three years, I devoted myself to the research and comparison of various definitions of territory. From this, I concluded that there were three periods of Goe rules. The first period was before the 10th century. Territory was defined as 'lu'. Besides 'lu' (or vacant points) nothing else was counted. This method can also result in negative territory. Among the stones played, regardless of live stones, dead stones or cap-

tured stones, nothing was counted as 'lu'. They had to be deducted from the total number of the 361 intersections. The current rules used by the Japanese and Koreans were the old rules of China, which were introduced into these countries during the Nanbei Dynasty (420-589). Around the middle period of the Ming Dynasty (after the 15th century) the definition of territory in the Chinese Goe Rules evolved to counting stones only (the second period of the Goe rules). Every group had to retain two basic eyes which were not counted as territory (i.e., there was a group tax of one stone for every group). All the other vacant points were treated as live stones. This method counted the total number of live stones on the board from both sides to determine the winner and is known as the 'Stone-Counting Method'. Most of my comprehension of the knowledge of Goe rules came from studying Dr. Yang Liansheng's essay, *An Investigation on the Evolution of the Counting Method of Wei-ch'i*. Therefore, the importance of his contribution in the amendment of the Goe Rules cannot be overemphasized. The third period of Goe rules defines territory as 'both stones and vacant points' (the SST Rules). At the end of each game, the intersections of the board are either vacant or occupied by stones. Therefore, this method defines all intersections as territory; no intersection point is excluded; every point is to be counted. The sum of the territory from both sides equals to the total number of intersections. The difference of the territory from both sides gives the margin of victory.

(Translated by Sidney W.K. Yuan)

Three Life and Death Problems

Tei Meiko 9-dan



History of the Codification of Goe Rules

by Ing Chang-Ki

1) The Age of Verbal Rules Has Ended


For over four thousand years, Goe players have been relying on rules that were passed on verbally from one generation to the other. There were no written rules. In some cases of the basic regulations like the capturing of stones and for simple ko situations, one can easily memorize these verbal rules. However, not everyone can remember rules for the less common situations, e.g. Eternal Life Ko (*chosei ko*), Triple Ko (*san ko*), and Round-Robin Ko (*junkan ko*), etc. The verbal rules might be adequate for small, local tournaments or casual games. In this century, due to the rise of the Japanese professional Goe players, major newspapers started to sponsor lengthy Goe tournaments with rich prizes. Goe players as well as the general public are paying more attention to these tournaments and the rules they adopt. This has led to the discussion and criticism of Goe rules and how they affect the outcome of the tournaments. Especially in the past decade, the number of international tournaments has increased rapidly. The period of verbal rules has ended.

2) Go Seigen's (Wu Qingyuan's) Contribution to the Codification of the Rules


The first written Goe rules (*The Laws of Go*) were published by the Nihon Ki-in on October 2, 1949. The incident which led to the formulation of the written rules was as follows. During the ten-game match between Go Seigen and Iwamoto Kaoru in 1948, the following situation occurred in the first game, shown in *Dia. 1*.

A dispute arose at the end of the game over whether Iwamoto (Black) should eliminate the ko by capturing at 'a' or 'b'. Eliminating the ko will lead to one less point for Black. Iwamoto argued that due to his abundance of ko threats, he did not have to connect. Eventually, this dispute was settled when it was found that a Nihon Ki-in committee set up in Honinbo Shusai's time had drawn up a bylaw that agreed with Iwamoto's interpretation; thus it was adjudicated that Black did not have to

connect, so White had won by only one point instead of two. Professional Goe players were alarmed by this ruling. They worried that in a similar situation in the future, the one-point difference might change the outcome of the game. Thus, they came to recognize the need for written rules. The ones adopted by the Nihon Ki-in in 1949 required that all direct kos be eliminated at the end of the game, contradicting the previous adjudication. Unexpectedly, in 1959, another dispute involving Go Seigen arose during the second game of a three-game match with Takagawa Shukaku (see *Dia. 2*).



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

At the end of the game Takagawa insisted that Go Seigen (White) must connect at 'a' subject to the rules of the Nihon Ki-in, to eliminate the possibility of a ko. Go Seigen, on the other hand, refused to connect, because it would result in one less point for him. Go Seigen argued that the question of whether one needs to reinforce should be decided by the player and not by blindly following the rules. Both sides held out for a few months. Eventually Go Seigen, without support, agreed to connect at 'a' and thus lost the game by half a point. As a condition of agreeing, Go demanded that the Nihon Ki-in amend its Laws of Go as soon as possible. However, more than 25 years have passed since this incident and satisfactory revisions have still not been made.

3) Judging the Above Two Games by the Ing Rules

In the first game, Iwamoto concluded that he had more ko threats, so there was no need to connect at 'a' or 'b' in *Dia. 1*. This kind of reasoning is absurd, as there is no example in the history of Goe that an existing ko is not

required to be eliminated. According to the Ing Rules, a hot stone can be recaptured after an intervening pass play. No matter how many ko threats Iwamoto had, Go Seigen could still win the ko because he had an infinite number of pass plays. Under the Ing rules the game adjourns (to confirm dead stones) after two consecutive pass plays and ends with four consecutive pass plays.


As for the second game between Go Seigen and Takagawa, Go was right in saying that 'whether one needs to reinforce or not should be decided by one's skill and not the rules.' The intricate provisions in the Japanese rules are ridiculous and unfair. As expected by Go Seigen, the Nihon Ki-in failed to come up with the appropriate reform of their rules in a reasonable time. Using Ing's rules, these kinds of disputes would never have occurred in the first place. Because both stones and vacant points are territory, it costs the players nothing to place a stone in their own territories. Any question of reinforcement can be played out on the board without resorting to arbitrary decisions.

(Translated by Sidney W.K. Yuan)


An Introduction to Tesuji

by Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan


This series is intended for novice players. In it I will cover all the basic tesujis that you are most likely to encounter in your games in simple easy-to-understand positions. This first installment is about tesujis used to capture stones. To begin with, try solving the three problems given below. As Black your task in each is to capture the marked white stones. Answers along with other examples are given on page 61.



Problem 1



Problem 2




Problem 3


Joseki Exercises

Below are 20 elementary joseki positions. In all problems, choose Black's next move from A, B, or C. Time limit: 30 minutes. If you score 16 or better, your feeling for joseki is around the shodan level. Answers on page 63.


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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19



20



The 49th Honinbo Title Match: Game Seven

In spite of losing the first game, Cho Chikun got off to a good start in this title match, winning the second, third, and fourth games. He became fairly confident that he would successfully defend his Honinbo title for the fifth time. But then he lost both the fifth and sixth games, and, with the score even in this seven-game match, he began to lose confidence that he would be holding this title for the sixth consecutive term.

In the sixth game, Cho made an uncharacteristic blunder. Short of time, he was analyzing a difficult position and, to gain time, he made a move that he thought was sente and would cause him no loss. Unfortunately, the move wasn't sente and it turned out to be the losing move. This blunder must have made the loss of the sixth game even more unsettling, and now Cho felt that his back was to the wall. But this is exactly when he performs at his best. Some power in him seems to be activated subconsciously and he becomes almost invincible. Moreover, in the last game of a series he always makes his best efforts.

White: Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 8 hours each

Played in Ibaragi Pref. on July 21–22, 1994.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

Figure 1 (1–31). *Fifty minutes for the first two moves!*

This was an exciting game. It was decided when Kataoka made an oversight at the start of a difficult endgame. At first glance, Kataoka seems like a very cautious player, but appearances may be deceptive.

Cho spent 14 minutes on his first move and then another 35 minutes on Black 3. Before a game of a big title match begins, observers are in the playing room and photos are taken, but when the first move is made, they usually leave the room in deference to the players. In all my years of playing in and observing title matches, this was the first time I had ever seen them kept waiting for more than ten minutes.

The formation of Black 1 and 3 on the star points in opposite corners is known as *tasuki*. Black 5 is a common follow-up.



Cho defends his Honinbo title for the fifth consecutive time.





Figure 1 (1-31)


Black 11. In the past, 11 was usually played at A, but recently Black 11 has come into fashion. The reason is that the cap at 13 in relation to the stone at 11 has a good feel to it.

White 14 at B or 16 is also possible.

Black 15 is a bit unusual. Black 1 to 5 in *Dia. 1* are one common joseki. White 2 at 4 is also possible; Black 3 and White 'a' would follow. However, the sequence from Black 15 to 19 has been seen before in professional games.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

When Black played 19, he expected White 20. Black welcomed this move because it gave him the opportunity to solidify his left side with the moves to 25. However, White is not dissatisfied either. His stones are out in the open and he has made one solid eye.

White cannot omit 28 and 30. If he does,

Black will confine him to the side with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*. Trying to break out with 'a' fails when Black cuts with 'b'. Even if White can switch to a good point elsewhere after 3, permitting Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2* would be depressing.

Figure 2 (31-49). A spiritless move

From the time when White played 12, Black was waiting for the chance to attack with 31. Once White plays 32, the moves to 35 become inevitable.

Turning at White 35 instead of 34 might be a calm move, but making such bad shape would be unbearable.

After White 34, the moves to 39 are a natural flow. White 36 aims to play either A or the sequence White B-Black A-White C. However, Black can still attach at D, so White is in no hurry to play these moves.

With White 40 and the following moves, there are many possible alternatives. For example, White 40 could also be played at E. The advantage of this move is that Black would not have such a fine attacking move as 41. The disadvantage of E, however, is that the large-knight move from 38 to E is overstretched and thin. It is hard to say which move is better.






Figure 2 (31-49)

Black 43 is also hard to evaluate. My first instinct would be simply to play 1 in *Dia. 3*; White would answer at 2. By playing 43 as in the game, White 46 ends up one line lower than 2 in *Dia. 3*. It is hard to evaluate if this is a plus or a minus; it is a very subtle point.



Dia. 3

Black 47 is not the kind of move that Cho usually makes. To be frank, it was completely spiritless. Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4* are thicker. Black 3 will somehow be able to link up with the marked stones. If White plays 2 at 3, Black counterattacks by playing 'a'.



Dia. 4

Figure 3 (50-79). Repaying the debt

In this figure it became clear that Black 47 in *Figure 2* did not serve to secure the territory at the top. Because Black tried to take the lead in territory with 47 and 49, White 48 became a good, calm move. Black was forced to repay the debt he incurred in the center by going all out for territory.

White was now positioned to attack the black group in the center to make Black pay for his greediness. Whether or not White can gain enough from attacking the black group to make up for the profit Black has taken is the theme of this game.





Figure 3 (50-79)


White launches his attack by striking at 50, and Black has to go back and reinforce his position with 51. White is now threatening to isolate the black stones by playing A, B, or C. However, these moves are left for later.



Dia. 5

First, White must gouge out Black's territory at the top with the moves 52 to 56. The timing of these moves is important. If White neglects to play them, Black 1 in *Dia. 5* is a very big move. Not only is it big, it also gives Black the right to play the satisfying forcing moves from 3 to 9. Note that after White 56, these moves cannot be played because after Black 7, White could play 8 at 'b' or 9.

What about Black 55? Black would like to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6*, but after White 2, the marked stone will be captured and White's stones in the center will have become strong.



Dia. 6

White must not play 2 at 3. Black would answer with 'a' and White's territory would be small.

Black 59 and 61 are greedy. Black is avoiding the issue of his weak stones in the center.

Black 77 and 79 were good moves. If Black played 77 at A, White would play B, isolating the black stones at the top.

Figure 4 (80–117). *White misses a strong move.*

However irritating, White has to play 82 and 84, letting Black link up his stones. If White plays 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black will play 2, sacrificing his marked stone (if White 'a', Black 'b'). Now all of Black's stones are connected. This is the reason why Black 77 and 79 in *Figure 3* were such good moves. Still the black stones in the upper left have been cut off from the ones on the right, so White should be able to gain some profit by attacking them. That's the consolation for White. However, we now come to the main problem of this game.





Figure 4 (80–117)


White's moves from 94 to 98 probably do him no harm, but White 100, threatening to take away Black's eye space, was a bad overplay. White should have followed *Dia. 8*, first exchanging 1 for 2, then playing 3 to 9. Had he done this, Black would have paid for his greediness in playing 47, 49, 59, and 61 in *Figures 2* and *3*. Had Kataoka played in this way, the game would still have been a toss-up.

White 1 in *Dia. 8*, leaving the capture of Black's marked stone, is bigger than it looks. To understand this, look at *Dia. 9*. Black can aim at the sequence beginning with 1 in the


center. If White plays 6 to forestall Black 'a', Black can later play 7 to 17, capturing the marked white stones. White 'b' (1 in *Dia. 8*) would also serve to protect against this.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

14: connects

Naturally, Kataoka had read out the sequence from Black 101 to 105, but what he overlooked was Cho's strong throw-in at 109, creating a ko. Kataoka didn't expect Cho to make this move because White gets to take the ko first, but what he didn't see was that Black 111 becomes a ko threat.


If Black plays 109 at 111, then White plays 2 in *Dia. 10*. Then if Black throws in at 3, White takes with 4 and Black has no ko threats. If White can take at 'a', he has no problems and gets a superior position. But when Black plays 109 first, after White takes with 110, Black 111 becomes a ko threat. Now when White captures at 112, Black connects at 113 and the white group at the top is dead. This is what Kataoka overlooked.



Dia. 10

For a careful player like Kataoka, this was an unusual oversight.

White could avoid the ko by playing 2 in *Dia. 11*, but letting Black make the ponnuki of 3 in sente would be unbearable.



Dia. 11

Therefore, White 110 and 112 are his only moves. He must now pin his hopes on capturing all the black stones in the center. Since White has played 112, the sequence in *Dia. 9* doesn't work any more, because White 10 can now be played at 11, followed by White 13, so White escapes.

Figure 5 (118–163). Fear of losing a won game

This oversight of Kataoka was the highlight of the game. Had he been aware of this ko, the result would have been decided in the

endgame, and White had many good endgame points, so there was a good chance Kataoka would have won. As it was, even with Kataoka's big mistake, Cho won by only 3 1/2 points (9 points on the board).





Figure 5 (118–163)

The close result was because of Cho's safety-first play. There were those, however, who felt that Cho was afraid he was going to throw 'certain' victory away, and for that reason lost points. Even the great Cho Chikun knows fear in the face of the pressure of the final game of an important title match.




Dia. 12

If White played 18 at A, Black would slide to 31 and win by a big margin. By playing 18 first, White can capture on a larger scale with 22.


Instead of 21, Ishida thought that Black could play 1 in *Dia. 12*. White 2 is the only

move, whereupon Black lives cleverly up to 13. White must play 6 to stop Black from playing 'a', which sets in motion the sequence from 1 to 17 in *Dia. 9*. This sequence would now succeed, since Black has a stone at 5.



Dia. 13

It is possible that 6 could have been played at 'b', to which Black would respond with 'c'; it is unclear what would happen. For that reason, instead of Black 5 in *Dia. 12*, Ishida recommended Black 1 in *Dia. 13*. Black 1 and 3 make *miai* of living and of playing the sequence from 13. If Black plays 4 at 5, Black plays 4, making *miai* of cutting at 'a' and living with 9. When White plays 4 and 6 to stop Black from living, the sequence to 17 follows, and, as mentioned earlier, Black 'b' and 'c' become *miai*.



Dia. 14

Black 33 was a tight move. If Black omits it, playing 1 in *Dia. 14* instead, after Black 5, White first exchanges 6 for 7, then snakes his way into the bottom territory with 8 and 10. If Black tries to link up to the left of 5, White will capture the two marked stones. Therefore, Ishida recommends that instead of 33, Black should first play 55, forcing White B, then come back and defend with 43.

When Cho played 59, he was finally able to relax because he knew that he had the game in the bag. 'If White had jumped to 1 in *Dia. 15*, instead of 56, my brain would have been destroyed. I might even have lost,' said Cho.

Being forced to give way up to 6 is certainly painful, but Black gets to block at 10; if he then answers 11 with 12 and 14, then, according to Ishida's calculations, he still wins by eight points on the board. He might have suffered a psychological blow, but his win would have been safe.

Figure 6 (164–240). Six consecutive terms as Honinbo


With this win, Cho has now held the Honinbo title for six consecutive terms (he has held it eight times in total). If he can successfully defend it again next year, he will equal Sakata's mark of seven consecutive Honinbo titles. A more distant goal is to equal or break Takagawa's record of nine consecutive terms as Honinbo. Whether or not he succeeds, Cho still has established himself as one of the great players of this century.

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Igo Club, Oct. 1994. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro.)



Kataoka fails in his first bid as Honinbo challenger.



Dia. 15




Figure 5 (164-240)

The 19th Gosei Title Match: Game Four

Kobayashi won the first game of the Gosei title match, but, having lost the second and third games, he was at *kadoban* and in danger of losing the title. In this game, the fourth, he was unable to attain his usual form and lost. He had now lost the Kisei title as well as the Gosei title. This was his worst slump in the last several years.

'I have to apologize to Kobayashi for winning games against him that I should have lost,' Rin said humbly. But it was clear he was eagerly looking forward to challenging Kobayashi in the upcoming Meijin title match.

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Kobayashi Koichi, Meijin

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 5 hours each

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on August 10, 1994.

Figure 1 (1-29). *Kobayashi's lightning go*

Kobayashi played the moves in this figure at incredible speed. He did spend one minute to contemplate the invasion at Black 11, but he used almost no time for the other moves.

Figure 2 (30-51). *Who will take the initiative?*

Kobayashi finally started thinking hard

with Black 33. He had to choose between defending the side at 35 or pinching with 33.





Figure 1 (1-29)

Yoshiteru Abe 9-dan commented that Black 33 urged White to invade at the 3-3 point (37). However, after White lives in the corner with 9 in *Dia. 1*, Black 10 becomes a superb move, giving Black an ideal result. White played 34 to avoid this variation.



Dia. 1

Kobayashi thought about Black 51 longer than any other move in this game. The professionals following the game in the pressroom expected Black to play a capping move at A and seize the initiative taking aim at the white group on the right. 'I thought for a moment about playing A,' Kobayashi later said, but when White runs away with a diagonal move at B, 'I had no idea how to continue.'

Instead, Black intercepted with 51. 'A powerful move; full of fighting spirit,' commented Otake 9-dan.





Figure 2 (30-51)

Figure 3 (52-80). Black's sacrifice strategy

Black resolutely pushed up with 55 and 57, aiming at the invasion of 59. White has to be very careful here. For example, descending to 67 with White 66 in answer to Black 65 is dangerous. Dia. 2 shows what happens. When White defends with 5, Black squeezes with the moves to 14, and Black has an excellent result. Thus, White's only move is to atari with 66.

When he plays 71, Black shows his intention to sacrifice his five stones at the bottom. White has to spend some moves capturing the

black stones, while Black gets to play moves on the outside with 73, 75, and 77.



Dia. 2

White 76 looks strange, but it is the best move. If White thoughtlessly played A, he would get in to trouble. Black would play B, White 76, Black C, and White D. Next, wedging in with Black E is a strong move. It's clear that Black will now be able to capture the three white stones on the left.

Black 79 is the culminating move of Black's sacrifice strategy. Black is confident he will get compensation for his loss at the bottom by attacking the white group on the left.




Figure 3 (52-80) 69: connects at 60

Figure 4 (81-113). White also sacrifices.

Black 81 was an all-out move. Black's group in the center didn't have eye shape yet, and, if the white group on the left side lived, the result would be unsatisfactory for Black.

Kobayashi: 'This seemed to be the only move.'

Rin: 'This was the move I expected.'





Figure 4 (81-113)

If Black simply played A, White would answer at 82, Black 83, White 84. Black would not be happy with this result. If Black tried to strengthen his group in the center by playing at B, White would play C, Black D, White 82, Black 83, White A, and the attack on the white stones lacks forcefulness.

Instead of White 84, White 1 in *Dia. 3* is another way. The moves to White 7 are inevitable, and the white group is alive after White captures two black stones.



Dia. 3

Living is all very good, but you can't overlook the fact that Black gets thick in the center, which is a drawback. If White's aim is to attack Black's center group, he cannot choose this variation. When Black played 91, the white

group on the left was completely dead.

Rin regretted playing 92. 'At the time I thought it was a strong move,' he commented. White 92 aimed, of course, at attacking the center black group, but Rin felt he should have played more simply. That simpler way would have been a diagonal move at E. If Black then played at 94, White would capture the black group in the center by playing at 95. After Black escapes with 95 and 97 in the game, the position for White is unsatisfactory.

Figure 5 (114-240). *Black's losing move*

Because Black missed his chance to capture Black in Figure 4, the game was now quite close. Although White had a slight lead, he was not optimistic about his chances unless he could get an attack against the black group in the center. But at this decisive juncture Black made a mistake and lost his chance to win.

Black 21 was the losing move. This move should have been a hane at 26. White would then play 135, Black 136. The difference in territory between these moves and the ones in Figure 5 are big.

'Why did I play 21,' lamented Kobayashi. 'I guess I didn't understand the situation.'

When White made the well-timed squeeze with 122 and extended at the vital point of 126, Black fell slightly behind.

White 30 and Black 31 were miai, but finally White got to play 44. These were the moves where the margin of victory increased in White's favor.




Figure 5 (114-240)

25: connects below 23; 82: connects at 79

The 19th Gosei Title Match: Game Four

The game ended at 6:22 pm. White won by 5.5 points. Kobayashi was unable to win his seventh consecutive Gosei title, while this was the first time for Rin to hold this title.

Kobayashi's attitude during this game seemed strangely relaxed. The playing room is usually filled with tension when he plays, but

during this game it was missing. He seemed very calm. Next month the Meijin title match will begin and the challenger is Rin. I'm waiting to see if the tension that usually emanates from Kobayashi will return.


White wins by 5 1/2 points.

(Igo Club, October 1994. Translated by Okuma Osamu.)




A relaxed Rin, on his way to winning the Gosei title


Three Life-and-Death Problems: Answers



1. White 1 is the killing move. If Black blocks at 2, White ataris with 3 and White cannot connect at 5 because he is short of liberties. After 4, White finishes Black off with 5 and 7. If White plays 1 at 4, Black connects at 5 and lives.




2. Descending to 1 is a good move. If White 2, Black takes away an eye with 3 and 5. If White tries to make another eye with 6 and 8, after 7 and 9, White can't make a second eye because he is short of liberties. If Black 1 at 5, White plays 3; Black 1, White 2, and White lives.




3. Black 1 is the vital point which kills White. If White answers with 2, Black kills him with the moves to 7. If Black 1 at 5, White plays at 1, then if Black 'a', White lives with 6.


Answer to Joseki Exercises




Black 1 is joseki. If Black plays elsewhere, White plays at 1.




Black 1 is joseki. If Black 1 at B, White 'a' is severe.




Securing the corner with Black 1 is correct. White 2 completes the joseki.




Cutting with 1 is correct. The moves to 12 are one variation of this joseki.




Black 1 is joseki. Black would attach at A only if the marked stones were not exchanged.




Black 1 is essential. If Black played 1 elsewhere, White would play at 3.




Pushing up with 1 makes Black thick. If 1 at B, White cuts at 1.




Wedging in with 1 is joseki. If Black plays 1 elsewhere, White 3 gives Black a bad result.




Securing a base with 1 is big. White 2 completes the joseki.




Black takes territory with 1. Up to 6, White gets thickness in exchange.




Black must play 1. The moves to 6 are one variation of this joseki.




Defending with Black 1 is joseki. White will probably play 'a' next.




Securing a base with 1 is important. If Black plays 1 elsewhere, White will play 1.




Playing 1 at 2 is unreasonable. With 1 and 3, Black makes a base in the corner.




Black 1 is an important point. If Black plays elsewhere, White will cut at 'a'.




Making a base at Black 1 is important. If anywhere else, White 1 will become a big move.




Black should draw back at 1 and cut with 3. Black 1 at A is a bad move.



After 1 and 3, White cuts at 'a' or 'b', and Black takes the cutting stone.



If Black 1 at B, White will cut at 1, giving Black a bad result.




White wants to block at 1, so this is the best point. Next Black plays 'a' or 'b'.


Endgame-Calculation Exercises

How much is Black 1 worth in each of the 20 positions below? Time limit: 40 minutes. One point for each correct answer. If you score 14 or better, your endgame-counting ability is around the shodan level. Answers on page 64.


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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The 19th Meijin Title Match



Kobayashi Koichi was defending the Meijin title for the sixth year in a row, aiming at his seventh consecutive term as Meijin. His challenger, Rin Kaiho, was a dangerous opponent, having snatched away Kobayashi's Gosei title, which he had held for six consecutive terms. Now Rin was challenging Kobayashi Meijin for his last remaining title.

In the first game, as befits the opening game in a big title match, both players played extremely well, especially in the middle game. Move after move, each player played moves reflecting an incredible depth of reading. It led the commentator Otake to exclaim in admiration, 'This game is a masterpiece.'

Game One

White: Kobayashi Koichi Meijin

Black: Rin Kaiho Tengen, Gosei

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Played on September 7-8, 1994 in Tokyo at the Hanezawa Gardens.

Commentary by Otake Judan; report by Akiyama Koji

Figure 1. (1-32) A new joseki

This game was probably a masterpiece even though many dubious moves were played. The many excellent moves and ideas that occurred on the board more than offset these dubious ones. The volume and quality of the variations considered and abandoned, the skill in attacking and defending amazed the professionals watching the game. I have never seen a game that left me so exhausted.

Otake: 'This game was indeed a masterpiece, and I have to respect the two players for creating it. Before the game began, I mentioned to someone that the players would play fast on the first day. Psychologically, neither player likes to show any sign of weakness, so it is natural that they would play quickly. By noon of the first day's play, 47 moves had been made. There was a fierceness in the play not visible to the eye.'

In the bottom left corner, a joseki was played that has recently become popular. Blocking with 22 is unusual, but since White gets good shape when he makes an approach move at 24, he doesn't mind playing this way.





Figure 1 (1-32)

Rin: 'Maybe I should have played 3 on the star point.'

Otake: 'This is a difficult joseki. I wouldn't like to play either Black or White. The moves from Black 25 look natural. Instead of 29, Black would like to play 1 in *Dia. 1*, but White would block at 2. After that there is no way to immediately punish White in the bottom left, so Black will probably play 3. Since a cut at 'a' remains, this result is not very attractive for Black.



Dia. 1

White 32 is a thick move. If White pushes up at A, Black will be happy to play B.

Figure 2. (33-51) *Playing on a large scale.*

Otake: 'Black 33 is the kind of move Rin likes to play. Black is placing importance on the center; its drawback is that it makes White defend his territory on the side with 34. However, Black 35 maintains territorial balance. When Black plays 47, he has an easier game.'

After White played 48, White 50 and Black 51 were the focus of attention in the pressroom. First, let's look at White 50.






Figure 2 (33-51)



Dia. 2

The obvious response to Black 47 is White 1 in *Dia. 2*. However, this lets Black invade at the 3-3 point with 2 and take the corner up to 8, which is severe. After Black 10 and 12, he lives with 14. This is a bad result for White. Note that Black cannot cut at 'a' with 12 because the ladder is unfavorable.



Dia. 3

Next, let's look at Black 51. Most of the people watching the game were of the opinion that Black should have defended at 1 in *Dia. 3*; if White 2, Black 3. Since Black 'a' is virtually sente, he takes a large amount of territory at the top and gets an easy game.

Otake: 'In *Dia. 2*, it is also possible for Black to slide to 4 instead of invading at 2. If then White 2, Black would play 'b'. I do not agree that *Dia. 3* is better. Both Black 1 and 3 are defensive and narrowly focus on his own territory. It is only natural that the pincer of Black 51 is preferred; this is the natural flow of the game. When Rin played 33, he was playing on a large scale. Kobayashi also thought that Black 51 was the better move.'





Figure 3 (52-77)

Figure 3. (52-77) Why did Black let White link up?


Some players were of the opinion that Black played loosely by allowing White to link up with 56, and for that reason they thought he should have played as in *Dia. 3*. Another suggestion was that Black should play 1 in *Dia. 4*, resolutely preventing White from linking up. In that case, however, White defends the corner with 2 and 4 (or 'a'). This is not a very good result for Black. Even if Black now jumps to 5, White can play for *sabaki* by attaching at 6.



Dia. 4


Otake: 'I think that Rin's mental condition has been very good so far. At the bottom he let White defend without hindrance, and at the

top he let White link up. He is playing a leisurely game. However, Black 59 is not the kind of move we expect from Rin. It's too slow. If Black played 1 in *Dia. 5*, he would be ahead in my opinion. White 2 is out of the question because White would be crushed flat with 3 and 5. Instead of 3, immediately playing Black 5, sealing White in with 'a', or a knight move at 'b', would be natural.'




Dia. 5

Because of Black's indecisive diagonal move at 59, White started to move with 60 and Black is at a loss as to how to answer. Linking up from Black 1 to 9 in *Dia. 6* results in the marked stone being badly placed. On the other hand, playing 61 at 64, White A, Black B lets White swagger into the center with C.



Dia. 6

Otake: 'Although I didn't like Black 59, Black 61 impressed me. Only a player full of fighting spirit could have played a move like this. It was a wonderful move. Ordinary players would not think of a move like this because it seems to be inviting the opponent to cut him off. Kobayashi's 66 and 68 are probably natural. Even if White cuts with 1 *Dia. 7*, Black counters with 2 to 8; with this result White looks like the one who is cut off and chased.'




Dia. 7

White 72 cannot be omitted: Black is threatening to play D, a severe move.


White 74 was the move most severely criticized after the game. After 75 and 77 Black, has become very thick in the center and is on the way to winning the game.

Kobayashi: 'Although I thought I would be okay even with White 74, I still should have connected.'



Dia. 8


The connection Kobayashi is referring to is White 1 in *Dia. 8*. Black 2 and 4 were studied in the post-game analysis, but even if Black is allowed to play 6, White gets a good shape in the center after playing 5, 7, and 9. White now has the right to play forcing moves at 'a' and 'b', so he has no worries and is satisfied with this result. If Black plays 4 at 5 to stop White from moving out into the center, White can link up with his stones on the left with 'c'. Compared to the position in the game, Black's wall, enclosing the center, is much thinner. It is strange that Kobayashi overlooked the sequence in *Dia. 8*. Why did he dislike the connection at 1?



Dia. 9

Otake: 'Nobody really knows. Rin said that if White connected at 1, he was thinking of

playing the diagonal move of 2 in *Dia. 9*. If White cuts with 3, two black stones will be captured with the moves up to 9, but then Black peeps with 10, and the life of the white stones in the corner comes into question. Instead of White 5, White could play 1 in *Dia. 10*. Black would then play 2, and after White 3, an awkward ko for White remains. Kobayashi may have disliked this prospect. Whatever the case, he still should have connected with 1 in *Dia. 8*. The position in the game is even more unfavorable for him than any of these variations.'



Dia. 10

The jolt of Rin's severe move at 61 is perhaps what made Kobayashi play passively.

Up to this point, most of the spectators in the pressroom had thought that White was leading, but after 77 they started to favor Black.





Figure 4 (78-105)

Figure 4 (78-105). Nobody knows what the next move is.

Otake: 'The forcing moves from White 78, fixing the position, are also incredible. Only a player like Kobayashi would have the courage to play like this. Since he is behind, he would


like to keep the game as open as possible and not settle the shape. Nevertheless, by playing patiently he keeps up the pressure on Black.'

Black 85 was the long-considered sealed move, ending the first day's play. It was totally unexpected. The spectators in the pressroom thought that Black would attach at 89 or play a diagonal move at 94 in the bottom right corner.



Dia. 11

Otake: 'I liked 85. It is the simplest move. If instead Black attaches at 89, it is uncertain what will happen. Black 1 in Dia. 11 is also conceivable. Black threatens to play to the left of 2, so if White is forced to play at 2, this would be a major gain for Black. Although the attachment of White 'a' remains, it is not important. However, White would never play like this. Against Black 1, White would play 2 and 4 in Dia. 12. Since a cut is left at 'a', Black, who is leading, would probably not choose to play in this way. Anyway, at this stage of the game, Black does not want to play on the second line.



Dia. 12

If White omits 86, Black would attach at A, stopping White's progress into the center.

In response to White 94, Black plays 95 to take sente, and, after cleverly playing 97 and 99, switches to 103 and 105. Black has rapidly expanded his territory in the center.

Kobayashi: 'I had no idea where to play next.'

Otake: 'From whichever direction White erases Black's moyo, Black will make a wall to enclose a sizable territory. Kobayashi must

have taken great pains over his next move. For example, the moves of White B, Black C, White D clearly leave White behind in territory after Black E. The action from here on was the highlight of the game. The next few moves are profound and subtle and are really worth a close look.'

Figure 5 (106-116). Brilliant attacking and defending techniques

White 6 is more than an erasing move: it is death-defying invasion. Black plays 7, threatening to capture this stone. However, without responding to White 8 with A, Black unexpectedly switches to the bottom and attacks with 9 and 11.




Figure 5 (106-116)

Otake: 'Both players are switching back and forth between attack and defense. This is not an easy situation for either player to deal with. The direct course of blocking with Black 9 at A, White B, Black C, White D, Black E, White F, Black G (defending against the ladder), White H, Black I is risky. Rin naturally wants to create a lull in the battle.

Black 9 and 11 were played as a ladder block. White cannot respond at the bottom with 12 because Black will play A, White B, Black C, White D, Black E, White F, then after Black H, White will be destroyed. White's move at 12 is very clever.


'White is reading deeply,' Otake said with admiration.

In short, if White connects at 1 in Dia. 13, Black is ready with the powerful moves 2, 4,

and 6; White's stones at the bottom will die with the moves to 20. By playing White 1 at 'a', after the sequence at the bottom is played out, White could play 'b', White 'c', then cut at 'd', and his stones will not die.

After reducing the bottom area in sente with 13 and 15, Black is still in the lead, even though White has defended skillfully. A better way of putting it is to say that Black has only solidified his lead.

However, things now get really complicated.



Dia. 13

Figure 6 (117-200). Two losing moves

Otake: 'I told Rin that Black 17 and 19 might be questionable. It seemed to me that 20 and 22 were more valuable. It was my feeling that Black could have won easily by playing the diagonal connection of 1 in Dia. 14, then expanding his territory at the top with 5 after White connects at 4. If Black wants to play in the lower left corner, sliding to 'a' would be better. The best White could do is to connect at 'b', then Black 'c', White 'd', and Black extends to 'e'. Although Black ends in gote, he can expect the big endgame move at 'f'. I think the reason the game became difficult was because of Black 17 and 19.'

Kobayashi continues to threaten the Black group at the bottom by jumping to 30 and cutting with 38.

Everyone in the pressroom was surprised by Black 47. In spite of the limited time remaining, Kobayashi continued to fight. Normally, Black 52, which is safer, would be played.





Figure 6 (117-200)



Dia. 14


Otake: 'Watching the game on satellite television, I thought that Black 47 was a terrific move and Rin had read out all the variations when White pressed at 52, and this showed what a great player Rin is. But this was not the case. At 47, the only move for Black was the diagonal move at 52. This would have made miai of pressing at A and blocking at 95. Black would have then had a definite lead.'

Rin said that Black 47, which allowed White 52, might have been the losing move. Still, although Black 47 was one of the moves that contributed to his loss, it was not the move that actually lost the game. My conclusion was that psychologically Black 55 was the real losing move.

Otake: 'He knew it was a bad move, but he played it anyway. He had no one to blame for


this mistake but himself. He must have been very upset after playing it. Anyone can see that Black 1 in *Dia. 15* should be played first. Black then connects up to the top with 3 to 7 for an easy win.'

After White ataried and connected with 56 and 58, Black was at a loss for a good move. He had to play 59, but the fact that White could force with 60 and 62 was very bad for him. Compared to *Dia. 15*, the moves in the game were about five points worse for him.



Dia. 15

So Black 55 lost the game? That's not the case either. Black 67 was the actual and final losing move.



Dia. 16

Otake: 'Black 67 was the smallest move. If Black is going to play in this area, 1 in *Dia. 16* is better. Although White can play 2 to 12 in sente, Black's stones at 5 and 13 make him thick. That would make him three or more


points better than in the game. Alternatively, 'a' instead of Black 1 is also big. If Black had chosen either of these moves, he wouldn't have lost.'

Black kept choosing one losing move after another as if he were bewitched.

Black 71 has nothing to do with winning or losing, but this move should have been played at 74.

Black 95 on the right allowed White to play 96, which widened the margin of victory. White 96 was an excellent move and made a fitting climax to this exciting game.

Instead of 95, if Black had played 1 in *Dia. 17*, the game would have been decided by half a point. However, in the pressroom, both Ishida Yoshio and Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan declared that the half-point win would have been White's.



Dia. 17




Figure 7 (201-281)

79: connects at 64

Figure 7 (201–281). *Overcoming repeated setbacks*

The following is a question-and-answer session with Otake.

Akiyama: Would Rin be upset because he let slip repeated chances to win?

Otake: Rin is probably not unduly affected. He played freely and imaginatively. Because the reasons for losing were clear, he can accept the result. When I met him the following day, he was quite relaxed.

Akiyama: Has Kobayashi regained his old form?

Otake: Had he lost this game, he would have suffered a major shock. It could easily have been an overwhelming loss for him. But the fact that he overcame his setbacks and relentlessly put pressure on his opponent indicates that he has regained his old form.

Akiyama: How do you think the next game will go?

Otake: I really don't know. But whatever the result, I would like to see another game like this one, with each side fighting desperately to win. But I must reiterate: this game was a masterpiece. Even as an spectator, I was exhausted after watching it. You can imagine the toll it must have taken on the players.

White wins by 2 1/2 points.

(Igo Club, November 1994. Translated by Nakada Mitsuru)


Game Two

This game was played one week after the the first game in Tokuyama City, Yamaguchi Prefecture. I traveled there with both players, so I could witness all the tension that built up before the game. Moreover, I was able to have in-depth discussions about the game with the players on the way back to Tokyo.

As with all big title-match games played over two days, it was a very intense game. Just by looking at the game record, we could almost sense the breathing of the players. But the excitement increased when watching the game in the playing room.

Like the first game, this one was also a masterpiece. In that game Rin was satisfied with the way he played, so losing it didn't upset him too much. However, by posting the first win, there was less pressure on Kobayashi

than on Rin. We are able to feel Kobayashi's relaxed attitude, while some feeling of being under pressure was evident in Rin's play. Since he was relaxed, Kobayashi could play freely and at his own pace.



Reference Diagram

The highlight of this game is shown in the reference diagram. Against Black 1, which aims to make sabaki, the cut of White 2 is severe. I thought that this move would unsettle Kobayashi, but he calmly played 3 and 5, then 7, which was a brilliant tesuji. I am not sure at what point in the game Kobayashi read out Black 7, but playing such a move proves that he is one of the top contemporary players.



Rin looks disappointed at his results in this match.

White: Rin Kaiho Tengen, Gosei
 Black: Kobayashi Koichi Meijin
 Komi: 5 1/2; time: 8 hours each
 Played on September 21–22, 1994 in Tokuyama
 City, Yamaguchi Prefecture
 Commentary by Otake Hideo




Figure 1 (1–30)

Figure 1 (1–30). *Their favorite opening moves*


As the referee, one of my duties is to announce the commencement of the game. The reporters and the cameramen then withdraw from the playing room and I leave with them. My other duties are to seal the final move at the end of the first day's play and then to open the sealed move when the game resumes on the following day. Finally, it is my job to confirm the game's result. In the meantime, there is a side room with a television monitor where the reporters and I can retire and leisurely watch the game for its two-day duration.

Black 1, 3, and 5 are called the Kobayashi Opening. This pattern is Kobayashi's specialty. In a seven-game match, he will play this opening in at least one game. Rin was familiar with it, so the fuseki was played at high speed. Up to Black 15, the total time consumed by both players was only five minutes.

White 16 and 18 are Rin's favorite pattern. This sequence doesn't put much emphasis on territory, but it is thick. Rin is known for his fondness for a territorial game, but he can play a moyo strategy too.

A week later, Rin and Kobayashi played the

identical opening in their game in the Kisei tournament, but this time, instead of 16, Rin responded to the black approach move (the marked stone) with 1 in *Dia. 1*. I don't think he played differently because he lost the Meijin game; rather, he just wanted some variety. I am sure that he will play 16 again in the future because he is very fond of this pattern.



Dia. 1

When a star-point stone is attacked by two approach moves, White 1 in *Dia. 2* is a popular joseki. But in this case, the strong black position that results at the top left makes the white formation at the bottom thin. Black can exploit this thinness by playing at 'a'. This is a cause of concern, and even if it doesn't take territory, White 22 is a thick move that strengthens White's overall position.


Black 25 is a new move. Black usually plays 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*.

Figure 2 (31–49). *A disagreement*


White 34. In the post-game analysis I said to Rin that I thought White 34 was against the flow of the game. Why was he in such a hurry to play here? Why not play White 1 in *Dia. 4*? White 1 could also be played one line to the right. This move prevents the two marked stones from running away. At the same time, White definitely doesn't fall behind in territory. If there were urgent points on the board, it would be a slow move, but since there were none, it was the best move. The basis of this judgment requires a long explanation.

Black has sure territory at the top left and bottom left and together they are worth a bit less than 30 points. Add another 10 points for the bottom right corner and we get a total of about 40 points.

If White gets territory right through the center, from top to bottom, it will amount to much more than 40 points.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (31-49)


It's Black's turn to move next. Even if we assume that Black tries to destroy White's moyo by playing at 'a', White will still get 20 points at the top and 20 points at the bottom. Therefore, the white and black territories balance. In Dia. 4, if Black plays 'a' and White plays 'b', the exchange of 1 for 'a' stops Black 35 to 39 in the game, so White 1 serves as a forcing move.



Dia. 4

However, Rin had a different opinion: 'Against White 1, Black would play 'c'; if then White 'd', Black 'e' would serve to erase White's moyo. The two white moyos would then be fighting over the same territory.'

This is what he was afraid of: White 1 becoming a target for Black to make sabaki. However, I thought that after Black 'e', pressing at White 'f' would have been enough to give White a good game.



Dia. 5

Kobayashi said that he wouldn't have played 'c'. Instead, he would have immediately played an erasing move at 'a'. In any case, he was happy when Rin played 34, since it allowed him to pull his two stones out with 35 and 37. Against White 38, which threatens to capture the two black stones, Kobayashi simply sacrifices them. The resulting white territory is nothing special, and even if the six *kikashi*

stones are attacked later, they have been played on the outside and, moreover, in sente. Thus, he bravely chose to invade with 49. If he drew back with the heavy move at 1 in *Dia. 5*, helping his endangered stones, he would have no prospect of being able to invade at 'a'.




Figure 3 (50-59)

Figure 3 (50-59). Kobayashi's delicate sense


In one sense fixing the shape with 39 to 47 in *Figure 2* was a bit inelegant, but he played this way in order to prepare for the invasion of 49. That is, if White ataris with 1 in *Dia. 6*, the marked black stone serves to create a ladder when Black plays 8. Therefore, White can't choose this variation. Obviously, Kobayashi put great value on that stone.

Sliding to 57 was a very good move, giving Black a stable position at the bottom.

The fact that a black attachment at A is a strong move means that White's shape must be considered defective. If White had a stone at B, then his shape would be respectable. Therefore, against 58, Kobayashi could afford to play lightly with 59. Black A has now become a critical point, and the value to Black of being able to play there means that, depending on circumstance, he may be able to afford to sacrifice his six stones in the center.


White 50 was the reason Kobayashi could be so flexible. Going back to Tokyo on the train, I showed *Dia. 7* to Rin. He stubbornly disagreed, but I still recommend this sequence.

After White 5 in *Dia. 7*, White 'a' becomes a good threat against Black's stones. White 'b' is another possible move.




Dia. 6

7: connects




Dia. 7



Dia. 8

A move like White 1 in *Dia. 8* would not leave Black with such a good move as A in *Figure 3*. White should have thought of some kind of stratagem such as this, but by playing 56, Black 57 became a good move.



Dia. 9

Instead of 57, the ordinary one-space jump at 1 in *Dia. 9* allows White to threaten the eye shape of the black group in the corner with 2 and 4. He can then play 6, directly attacking Black's eye shape at the bottom. By playing Black 57 and denying White such a counterattack, Kobayashi demonstrates his cautiousness, his prudent and his sensitive feel for the game.




Figure 4 (60-76) 68: takes ko at 60

Figure 4 (60-76). Rin must decide.


Usually the player that has to make a decision has to worry the most. If he takes the six stones he will have many things to think about. On the other hand, if he decides not to capture these stones, he can deal with the situation in a more leisurely way. Because Kobayashi's attitude is so flexible, the pressure is on Rin. Rin must have been quite anxious.

After fretting over this decision, Rin decided to go after the stones. But first he fixes the shape with the moves up to 69, then probes once with 70. Finally, he plays 72, going after the six black stones.


The 'leisurely way' would be the diagonal connection at 1 in *Dia. 10*, fixing up his shape at the bottom. However, Black saves his stones with 2. Rin had no confidence he could win in this position, because Black has sure territory in many different places on the board.

However, in the moves leading up to White 72, White's probe of 70 was a fine move. By exchanging this move for 71, White is promised the forcing moves of 84 and 86 in the next figure or the more direct moves of White

A, Black B, White C in this figure. The three marked stones can even be sacrificed because of this probe. Kobayashi cannot play 71 at A because White will counterattack with the moves 2 to 10 in *Dia. 11*.




Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Black also has sente moves at 'a' or 'b' after White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12*. If White can play 'a' before *Dia. 11*, the corner would become, at worst, a ko.



Dia. 12

At this point the time for the end of the first day's play was approaching, so it became



Kobayashi handing Otake, the referee, the sealed move

a question of who would play the sealed move. Kobayashi used two minutes for move 73, and Rin used one minute for 74. Black 75 took three minutes and 76 took five minutes. The tempo of these moves gave us a feeling of the competitors' fighting spirit. Finally, Black 77 became Kobayashi's sealed move and he spent 13 minutes thinking about it.





Figure 5 (77-93)

Figure 5 (77-93). A divinely inspired move

After the game Kobayashi said, 'Black 77 is the only move that will make sabaki.'

The observers in the pressroom could not


find any counterattack against the cut of 78, so they recommended Black 1 in *Dia. 13* instead of 77. But this would be good for White. If Black plays 1 at 2, followed by White 'a', Black 'b', Black's stones would be heavy.



Dia. 13


As if to emphasize the seriousness of the position after White 78, Black didn't make a move for one hour. Then he played the highlight moves of the game, 79 to 83.

After 82 some players might be able to find 83, but I wouldn't have had even a hint that this would be a good move. If Kobayashi found this move at the time when he sealed move 77 I would have to take my hat off to him. He didn't clearly indicate when he found it, but after the game he said 'I found 83 immediately after White 78. I then spent one hour checking the variations.'




Dia. 14

After Black 83, White has no good follow-up. Rin proposed *Dia. 14* as an alternative, but 4 is enough to give Black a good game.



Dia. 15

The meaning of Black 83 is to trade off the six black stones in the center for the three white stones on the bottom right. If White plays 1 and 3 in *Dia. 15*, then White gets the territory in the center, but Black gets the territory on the bottom right side with 6. If you count the black and white territories, you will find that they are unbalanced in favor of Black.



Dia. 16

Instead of 90, Rin gave *Dia. 16* as an alternative, but losing the two white stones when Black takes with 14 would be unbearable, so he abandoned this variation.

After analyzing all these variation, everyone agreed that Black 83 was a brilliant move.

Figure 6 (94–101). The diagonal connection is not good.

What with Kobayashi having come up with this brilliancy, the game is going from bad to worse for Rin. All his calculations have gone wrong.

The ideal position for White is *Dia. 17*. White cuts with 1 and 3, then blocks off the center with 5. Black can't omit 6, so White captures three stones with 7. This would be nice, but there's a big pitfall: Black won't play 6. Instead, Black will cut with 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', followed by the sente move of Black 'd', so Black captures four white stones in a ladder. To avoid the ladder, White might think about playing a diagonal connection at 'd' with 96 (the marked stone in *Dia. 17*), but *Dia. 18* shows that Black can peep at 4. (Note this peep: it is an important move.) Black then plays 6 to 12, and, after White 13, comes back and plays 14. In this position, pushing through and cutting with White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c' is followed by Black 'd'–White 'e'–Black 'f', and White must either give up the stone at 13 or his two stones at 'c' and 'e'. Against Black 6, White cannot omit 7 because of the exchange of the marked stones in *Dia. 19*.






Figure 6 (94–101)




Dia. 17

Dia. 19. If White plays 1 instead of 7 in Dia. 18, Black plays 2 and 4, and, after 6, the white atari at 8 followed by 'a' does not capture the three key black stones, so the moves to 14 follow and it is now Black who captures three stones in the center. This is why Rin can't make the diagonal connection instead of 96.



Dia. 18



Dia. 19

If White plays A instead of 100, Black can rescue his six stones in the center with the moves Black B, White C, Black D, White E, Black 100. This is the reason why White has to make the slow move of 100.

Figure 7 (101-133). Rin loses his fighting spirit.

Rin saved three stones with 4 and 6, but he had to give up five other stones to the left of them. What's more, Black 33 gained the whole bottom side. If Rin had been a bit calmer, he might have saved the stones at the bottom, but he seemed to have been caught up in the heat of the battle. If White plays 100 in Figure 7 at 1 in Dia. 20, Black forces with 2 to 8, then reinforces in good aji at 10. White now has to defend, as Black has the cut of 'b', aiming at 'a', so this variation is no better for White.






Figure 7 (101-133)




Dia. 20

Even so, White 4 and 6 were mystifying. White should have played as in *Dia. 21*. After 1 and 3, White has to defend with 5. Black then cuts with 10, and the moves to 15 follow. Next Black plays 16 or 'a'. Black may still be leading, but, even so, this was the only way for White to play.

Note that using Black 4 in *Dia. 21* to cut at 'b' just barely fails to work. After 1 to 5 in *Dia. 22* (Black 'a' is sente), White, with three liberties to Black's four, is captured, but instead of 4 White can capture at 'b'. Even if Black then ataris at 4 and White connects, Black has no way of capturing the top or bottom white group within four moves. Please confirm this for yourself.



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

After Rin realized that neither the solid connection at 96 in *Figure 6* nor the diagonal connection at 1 in *Dia. 18* worked, he probably lost half his fighting spirit. Even if he had played 28 at 33 to help his stones at the bottom left, a black move at 28 would still have given Black a big lead. You might think that White's central area is big, but the actual count is 40 points at most.

Figures 8 (134–175) and 9 (176–231). *The center fight decided everything*

As a result of his brilliant play Black was leading by about 20 points on the board at the beginning of this figure. However, at the time of resignation, the difference was estimated at 12 or 13 points. The reason for this decrease in the winning margin was Kobayashi's bad move of 85 in *Figure 9*. Had he simply played 85 at 87 and then connected at 92, he would have won by a big margin. Did he slacken up or did he make a miscalculation?




Figure 8 (134–175)

I would like to conclude my commentary by showing you that White cannot prevent Black's 'greedy' move at 49 in *Figure 8*. If White plays 1 in *Dia. 23*, Black hanes with 2 and White has no defense because Black 'a' and 'b' are threats. If White had played 'c' with 48 (the marked stone), Black 49 would not have succeeded. But Black 'd' gives Black an excellent squeeze, after which he switches to 'e'.





Figure 9 (176–231)

115: ko (87); 118: ko; 119: throws in two lines above 112; 120: takes stone above 112; 121: ko (87); 124, 127, 130: ko.



Dia. 23

This was an exciting game because of the attack and defense of the center. In the pressroom with me were players like Kobayashi Satoru, the Asahi newspaper commentator, and Yamashiro Hiroshi, who was doing the commentary for the satellite broadcast of this game. Even so, our analysis was a long way from being on a par with the players. Just to give one example, the reason why the diagonal connection with 96 (White 1 in Dia. 18) was not played was pointed out to us by the players during the post-game analysis.

Like always: the depth of reading of the players is far deeper than that of the observers, who have nothing at stake. Until we saw the brilliant move of Black 83, our forecast was that Black was in trouble. Anyway, White's losing move must have been played before the winning move of 83. My argument that White 34 was not a good move and should have been played in the center may not be completely irrefutable, but still, the losing move must be somewhere around here.

With a win in the first game in his pocket Kobayashi played freely and creatively. In the next game, however, I'm expecting great things from Rin.

Black wins by resignation.

(Kido, Nov. 1994. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro.)

Game Three

In the first game, Rin played well overall, even though he lost. Rin lost again in the second game when Kobayashi made a brilliant move and he was overwhelmed. In the third game that we are now going to analyze, Rin had victory within his grasp, because of an overplay by Kobayashi, but he let it slip. It began to look as if Kobayashi was going to defend his Meijin title with a clean sweep of four games.

White: Kobayashi Koichi Meijin

Black: Rin Kaiho Tengen, Gosei

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 8 hours each

Played in Atami, Shizuoka Prefecture on October 5–6, 1994.

Commentary by Otake Judan.

Figure 1 (1–21). *Obstinacy on the part of both players*

Rin played the *sanren-sei* opening with 1, 3, and 5. The joseki up to White 20 in the top right was also played in the second game. This time, however, Rin was playing White and he had a stone at 5 instead of A. In place of White 16, the sequence of White B, Black C, White 21, Black 19 is often seen. Recently, Kobayashi has been studying White 16. Rin was aware of this, but he still chose this joseki. He's always been fond of the moves from Black 9 to 13. However, there seems to be more to Rin's playing

this pattern than on-the-board strategy: he is determined to defeat Kobayashi with this joseki. If he doesn't, he will not be able to overcome him in this difficult series. This reveals an obstinacy on Rin's part.




Figure 1 (1-21)

Of course, this strong determination by Rin is felt by Kobayashi. When he played 6, he probably expected him to play this pattern. If so, then Kobayashi is also obstinate. This sets the mood of the game in which both players are accepting the other's challenge.

Figure 2 (21-35). A new pattern

Black 21 denies White the chance of linking up to his stone on the right. In the second game of this series, Rin jumped to 1 in *Dia. 1* and Kobayashi linked up with 2 and 4. In this game, Rin could have also let Kobayashi link up and got sufficient compensation. In *Dia. 2*, for example, against Black 1 White could link up with White 'a'—Black 3—White 'b', then Black could capture two stones by playing at 2, becoming thick in the center. However, since the position is different this time, White would not want to link up with 'a' and 'b' and would play 2 and 4 instead. I think this would also give a reasonable game, but Rin rejected it.

An interesting sidelight: several times a month, Rin invites young professional players to his home for study sessions. I was told by a participant that this pattern had been studied at these session with the conclusion that Black 21 does not produce a good result. In spite of this, Rin, who leads the discussions, dared to

play this pattern which had been labeled 'disadvantageous'. This is the way Rin is. He is not satisfied with the results of these sessions until they are verified in actual games.





Figure 2 (21-35)




Dia. 1

Dia. 2

The reason that Rin's game is still so energetic and retains its youthful vigor stems from the obstinacy mentioned above. I must also learn from this.

Kobayashi had probably researched all the countermeasures against Black 21. After the cut at 22, White 24 was a severe attachment. With Black 21 in place, the result to White 32 is to be expected.

Both players must have studied this joseki previously, but, to my knowledge, this is the first time this pattern has been played in a professional game. Therefore, it must be considered a new pattern.



It is necessary to explain why White doesn't play at A against Black 21. If White induces Black to connect at 22, White loses any chance of playing B. For example, with the cut of White 22 in place, if Black plays 1 in *Dia. 3* after White 30, White can push through with 2. This is possible only because the marked stone has been played.

The marked stone also prevents Black from playing 1 in *Dia. 4* against White 26. White can confidently play 4 and 6, and with White 8 in place, Black's six-stone group will be captured.

In answer to White 34, Black 35 seems to be an uneventful move, but...





Figure 3 (34-73)

Figure 3 (34-73). A painful detour


White 34 shows a decisiveness typical of Kobayashi. How do you readers feel about the moves from Black 35 on? Let's look at the moves from 35 to 46 in a separate diagram, that is, *Dia. 5*. I spoke to Rin after the game and said to him, perhaps a bit impertinently, that the moves from 1 to 11 were not typical of his style. White is occupying all the good points

with 2, 4, and 10, while Black is having a hard time developing. It might be that Rin is patient, but this kind of 'detour' is beyond the limits of patience.



Dia. 5

White has effortlessly wiped out Black's moyo and the game is proceeding at Kobayashi's pace.



Dia. 6

Dia. 7

When White plays 34, he is leaving himself open to an attachment at Black A. If White wants to forestall A, he could play the solid moves of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6*. Kobayashi felt that this would have been painful, so he defiantly played at 34. This showed his innate aggression, saying in effect, 'Come on and fight if you like.' Needless to say, White 1 would have been more effective had it been placed at 'a' in *Dia. 6*.

I think that Rin should have responded to Kobayashi's aggressiveness with some aggression of his own. It is hard to know what will happen, but a move such as Black 1 in *Dia. 7* is called for. Fortunately, Rin agreed with me and admitted that he regretted Black 35.

If Black had played 1 in *Dia. 7*, a hard fight would have ensued, but this was the only way to play. In the game, Black was unhappy when White built a comfortable position with 36.

In response to White 46, Black invaded at the 3-3 point in the top left corner with 47. He invaded again at 61 in the bottom left corner. He is playing a patient game, hoping for a chance later on. Normally, Black would like to attack the white group in the center, but if the group survived the attack and White got a chance to aim at B, Black would find himself with greatly reduced strategic options.

This is a time for patience. When Black does attack the center white group, he wants his attack to be decisive.





Figure 4 (74—114)

Figure 4 (74—114). *Patience pays off.*


'Good things happen to those who wait.' This is not necessarily true, but in this figure which side is leading has become unclear. If we were to pinpoint which white moves were questionable, 74 and 76 would be the first candidates. After that, the moves from 86 on.

Kobayashi might have thought that 74 and 76 were good, but two moves on the second line look like he is avoiding a fight. There is not any concrete sign of it, but one does get a hint that a chance might come Black's way.

Instead of 74, if White had played as in *Dia. 8*, he would at least have gotten to play the moves 7 and 11. If Black played 4 at 1 in *Dia. 9*, it would result in a one-point yose ko. Yet Kobayashi facilely forces with 74.



Dia. 8




Dia. 9


Black 79 was the sealed move. It was a powerful move. I liked it very much. Black is still looking for a chance to attack the white group in the center. But White responds with 80 to 84. These were excellent moves. If I were playing, the best that I would have been able to come up with is 1 in *Dia. 10*. Black 80 to 84 show what a good fighter Kobayashi is. If Black uses 85 to capture White with 1 in *Dia. 11*, White's group immediately gets eye shape with the moves up to 10.

However, the moves from 86 on were too aggressive. Black is looking for a fight, so this development is just what he wants.

Had White descended with 1 in *Dia. 12* and sacrificed two stones, Black would have been unable to get any advantage out of this position. After 7, White can squeeze with 'a' and 'b', and White's marked stone below on the second line would have become effective — Black's star-point stone in the lower right corner suddenly becomes thin.



Dia. 10




Dia. 11

Once White crawled with 86, the moves to 92 were the natural flow. Now when Black played atari and connected with 93 and 95, the marked stone and the stone at 86 began to work against each other. If White played 1 in Dia. 12, then the white sacrifice stones on the right would be helping their allies in the middle. Certainly the shape of 5 and 7 is very good for White.

Kobayashi: 'I got carried away and couldn't stop.'

White's group in the center and the ones on the left and right are all becoming a burden for Kobayashi. The moves from 86 on must have taken him by surprise: This couldn't be what he wanted.



Dia. 12

Figure 5 (115-138). *Pulverized or an honorable defeat.*

The moves in Figure 4 could not have been part of Kobayashi's calculations. The game was thrown into confusion. After Black 15 and 17, White pretends to be alive when he plays 18. But if Black gets a bit stronger on the outside, the life or death of this huge group comes into question. However, it is such a large life-and-death problem that it would be both exhausting and time-consuming to solve in a game.

Leaving the center as it was, Black switched to the bottom with 19 to 25. The fighting now became so large-scale, it was impossible to read out every move. In a sense, both players were relying on their fighting spirit.





Figure 5 (115-138)

When Black played 25, White pushed up at 26, and after 27, White played from 28 to 38: he was attempting to crush Black. But this was a gamble.


In such unpredictable fighting, it's a bit hard to expect the players to remain cool, but White could have avoided this frontal clash by playing as in Dia. 13. After patiently playing 1 and 3, when Black plays 4, White yields at 5 and can link up his stones by playing at either 'a' or 'b'.

Also, instead of 28, White could play as in Dia. 14, and both white groups would probably survive. It seems that Kobayashi was looking for a fight and was too impatient to accept either of these two peaceful alternatives, so he played the moves from White 28 on. However,

the next move Rin played was not covered by Kobayashi's analysis.



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

Figure 6 (139-156). Mistakes by both players

Both players misread the life-and-death problem in the middle of the board. We will look at the details later. But first, Kobayashi said that he never even considered Black 39 in his reading. He thought that Black would play 1 in Dia. 15. Up to 11, Black trades his stones on the left for the white ones on the right. Kobayashi thought that White came out of this exchange with a reasonable result. It is strange for a steady player like Kobayashi to make such a careless mistake. He seemed to have lost his cool.





Figure 6 (139-156)




Dia. 15

Against 39, if White cuts at 41, Black can push through with A and capture three white stones. I leave it to the reader to confirm this. Therefore, White had to play 40 and 42. If this black group lives, both the left and right sides will be affected, so White was desperate. But Black 43 was a significant move. By playing this move, Black gets the thickness he needs to kill the white group in the center. However, neither player was aware of it. And even if Kobayashi were aware of it, he still had to connect at 44. If he omitted this move, Black would play 1 to 13 in Dia. 16, and in the capturing race that would follow Black would capture the white stones. In other words, Black 43 threatens to capture either the white group in the center or the one at the bottom.

So it is not strange to say that this is a game that Black should have won. But the win slipped from Rin's grasp because of an oversight.


Black 45 was a good move, but he lost his chance to kill the white group when he abandoned his attack on it after White 50 and allowed White to play 56.



Dia. 16

Actually, when Kobayashi played 48 and 50 he was suffering from an oversight. He

thought that the sequence in *Dia. 17* gave a ko. The truth is that ramming into White with 1 in *Dia. 18* kills the whole group. If White 8 at 9, Black plays 8.



Dia. 17

There are many variations besides the two diagrams shown. Those who are interested could enjoy themselves for an entire day studying this position.

When White reinforces at 56, the game is over.




Figure 7 (157-200)


Figure 7 (157-200). Repeated mistakes

Since there is nothing else to comment on, we would like to show the position in *Dia. 19* again. Assuming that it would become a ko, Kobayashi played 1 and 3. By exchanging 1 for


Black 2, White loses the endgame move of 'a'. Rin judged the position too hastily and finished the game without realizing that Black 4 would have killed the white group. The shock of his two consecutive losses must have exhausted him. Had he not been threatened with his third loss in a row, the move of Black 4 in *Dia. 19* might have occurred to him.

Black resigned after White 200.

(Kido, December 1994. Translated by Nakada Mitsuru)




Dia. 18



Dia. 19

Reflections on the first three games


Before reviewing the fourth game, I asked Kobayashi to reflect on the first three games of this title match. His win in the first game was very important.



Dia. 1

Kobayashi: 'Some professionals said that White's position became bad because Black became thick at the top. However, I believe that this opinion is wrong. White's position was not bad in view of the original shape. The bad move was White 1 in *Dia. 1*. It was not good because White's territory on the lower side is decreased. White should have played at 'a' with 1. After studying the endgame from White 'a' on, I found that White would have been quite unlikely to lose. Anyway, it's certainly true that I was relieved to win this game.'


In the second game, Black's moves at 81 and 83 created a sensation. I thought that it was an excellent game for Kobayashi, but he did not think so.



Dia. 2

Kobayashi: 'I attached at 'a' in that game instead of connecting with 1 in *Dia. 2*. This allowed White to cut at 1. It was a dangerous way of playing, but I was lucky that things worked out right for me. If I had connected at 1, it would probably have become an easy game for me. If White answered at 2, I could have played 3 and 5, and a hane at 7. This way the game would not have become so close.'

Both players misread the life-and-death situation in the middle of the board in the game three.



Dia. 3

Kobayashi: 'We both went all-out with every move. The game developed an irresistible momentum, and I felt good while playing it. I do have quite a few regrets, though — for example, when Black attached at 1 in *Dia. 3*. I should have answered it by playing 'a', to settle my group. Fighting back with 2 was a terrible overplay. I had no time left to think and I didn't notice Black 13. After Black 17 and 19, White should have lost. All I can do is apologize for my oversight in reading out the life and death of that white group.'

Game Four

White: Rin Kaiho Tengen, Gosei

Black: Kobayashi Koichi Meijin

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Played on October 12–13, 1994 in Takarazuka City, Hyogo Prefecture.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi; report by Akiyama Koji.

Figure 1 (1-29). I intended to finish the match with this game.

Kobayashi: 'I intended to finish this match by winning the fourth game. If I lost, there would be no telling what would happen. Rin is dangerous: in two separate title matches, after losing the first three games, he came back to win four straight.'





Figure 1 (1-29)

The fuseki on the right side is a popular pattern, but this is the first time it has occurred in a game between Kobayashi and Rin.

In answer to 19, White attaches with 20. This move is often played by Korean players.




Dia. 1

Kobayashi: 'This move was also played in the past, you know. Still, Black should play 19 if at all possible. Even if White answered at 29,

it would not be a bad move because Black would have the chance of invading White's territory. However, Black 1 in Dia. 1 is perhaps also possible. Black is threatening to make a corner enclosure with 3, making a good shape, so White would have to invade with a move like 2. After Black 15, it's hard for White to find a good follow-up. White would like to extend to 'a', but Black would jump to 'b'. I can't tell whether or not this is good for White.


'I was troubled by White 20. Ordinarily, instead of 23 Black would descend with 1 in Dia. 2. However, I didn't want to play this move because White could establish himself on both sides with the moves to 6.'



Dia. 2


A new pattern was created when Black played 21. You can say that the fighting spirit of both players gave rise to the creation of this new pattern.

Kobayashi: 'Instead of 24, White could also play 1 in Dia. 3. I intended to answer that by playing Black 2 and 4. If the moves to White 9 followed, Black would be in a good position to attack the white group at the top with 10. If White 'a', it is enough for Black to answer with 'b'.



Dia. 3

'Instead of 9 in Dia. 3, if White extends to 1 in Dia. 4, Black is happy to take the corner with 2 in sente. Black can then invade on the right side with 4.



Dia. 4

'Up to Black 29, I was rather satisfied with my game. Rin told me that he was not quite satisfied.'





Figure 2 (30-57)

Figure 2 (30-57). *Oblivious to danger*

In the top left corner, White can play A in sente. However, White's group at the top becomes thin after Black B. Black also has the possibility of an invasion at C or D. Thus, the fight on the right side progresses with both players keeping a watchful eye on the top left.


Kobayashi: 'I expected White to invade at 30. Instead of 31, I also considered jumping to 54, but I could not find a follow-up when White jumps to F. The result from White 32 to 42 is even for both players. Instead of 32, a white hane at 33 is not good because after Black ataris at 32, the ladder is unfavorable for White.'

'Instead of White 38, linking with 1, 3, and 5 in Dia. 5 may be good. If Black 6, White 7, surprisingly, might give White quite a reasonable result. But this is not the case. If Black gets thick, invading at 8 becomes very severe, so White can't, after all, play like this. This is why White does not want to play the moves in Dia. 5.'



Dia. 5


White gets the territory in the corner and also aims at the cutting point between 31 and 41. Black is aware of this, but he has no choice but to invade at 43. After this, the clash between the two players is interesting.



Dia. 6

Kobayashi: 'The timing of the kikashi of White 44 is delicate. I thought of countering with Black 1 in Dia. 6. White first plays 2 then

connects at 4. Black can't permit White 3, so he has to counter with 3 to 7. However, when White plays 8, Black's result may not be good because White has invaded the bottom. After White connects at 14, if Black jumps to 'a', White attaches at 'b', leaving him with a good position. If Black jumps to 'c', White extends to 'd' and gets a thick position. After 45, Rin played White 46 as I had expected.'



Dia. 7

Attaching with White 1 in Dia. 7 has no meaning because Black links up with 2 and 4. After 5, Black 6 is severe on White. White 5 at 6 is not good either, because Black expands at 5.



The joy and satisfaction of winning the Meijin title for the seventh year in a row shows on the face of Kobayashi during the post-game analysis.

Black seems to be in good shape when he jumps out at 49. However, after White 50 to 56 Rin attempts to make a large-scale sabaki. Rin later said he felt like a carp on a chopping board: in danger of being carved up.

Kobayashi: 'The same applies to me. This fight is frightening because no one can predict what will happen.'

Figure 3 (58-73). Coming to grips with each other

Attaching with White 58 was a tesuji. There were many moves that Black could play instead of 59 and 61. However, Kobayashi made up his mind quickly.





Figure 3 (58-73)




Dia. 8

9: connects at 6

Kobayashi: 'White's moves were predictable, so it was easy to decide my responses. Instead of 59, if Black hanes at 1 in Dia. 8, White

would squeeze Black with the moves up to 8, and Black's chance of making a gote eye at 'a' would be lost, which is painful. If Black neglects to play 11 and instead captures White's stones on the lower right, Black's group at the top right would probably die after White plays 'b'. But even if he reinforces his group with 11, Black's position would not be good because White could break out with his group in the lower right by playing 16. This would be severe on Black.



Dia. 9

8: takes ko (below1); 11, 16, 19: takes ko

'When White wedged in with 60, I considered Black 1 in Dia. 9 as an alternative. Although Black is cut off after White 2 to 6, Black can squeeze White, while playing a ko, starting with the attachment of Black 9. Black next plays 25. White then cuts with 26, and Black makes a large-scale sacrifice so he can expand his territory at the bottom. This would probably be a close game.'

In the game, the players did not choose this messy sequence. By giving up two stones, Black was able to become thick in the center. He then punished White by playing 67. This result gives a close game like the one in Dia. 9, in Kobayashi's opinion.

Kobayashi: 'Instead of 68, if White played at 72 so as to avoid leaving Black with A, Black would threaten White's eye shape with Black 70-White B-Black 69. This would be big.'

White was able to make the long-awaited moves of 64 and 66, enclosing the territory on the left side. Black switched to a pincer at 73.

After the fierce hand-to-hand fighting, the board is peaceful again.

Figure 4 (74-100). White makes his first bad move.

Kobayashi: 'Up to now I hadn't played any bad moves; nor could I find any bad moves by Rin. This game was a close contest.'





Figure 4 (74-100)

In answer to White 74, Black leaned on White with 75 and White answered with 76. This move was severely criticized. 'Unbelievable! White A is only the move,' was the reaction of most people in the pressroom.




Dia. 10

Kobayashi: 'I can't believe that theory. I also would have played White 76 in answer to 75. Rin's move at 76 was natural in my opinion. Let's consider White 1 in Dia. 10.'

Black first settles the shape on the upper side with the moves from 2 to 12. He then maps out the territory in the center while attacking with Black 14, 16, and 18. Calculate Black's territory in this diagram. If Black can get 20 points in the center, the game will be close. However, Black's center is over 20 points. If White had played 1, I would have accepted the challenge no matter who the opponent was.'


After 77 and 79, Black 81 was the vital point. If omitted, Black's shape would be spoiled by an atari at White 81.



Dia. 11

Drawing back with 83 was a good answer to White 82. When Black jumps to 85, White cannot make life at the bottom in only one move. If Black blocks at 1 in Dia. 11, Black has no good answer to White 2 and 4. If Black connects at 'a' instead of 3, White can live by playing at 'b', so he will have almost no worries.

Kobayashi: 'White 86 is too greedy. It's the first bad move by Rin in this game. It is worth 15 points and helps White's group on the left, so the temptation to play it is understandable. However, now is not the time. If White plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 12, the situation remains fluid.'



Dia. 12

When Black played 89, White's position became thin at one blow. If White played 90 on the left to strengthen his group there, Black would cap with 90 and White would not be able to live.

However, Black 91 was a strong tesuji. White could not resist because of the power of Black 89.

Kobayashi: 'In my opinion, the game was over when Black played 95. But I was careless

and the tables were immediately turned. My lead caused me to become excited.'

Think about Black's move after White 100. If Black had played the right move, he would have had a clear win. It's not a particularly brilliant or difficult move.





Figure 5 (101-151)

Figure 5 (101-151). *Losing a liberty, losing life*


Black 1 was not the right move. Black should have extended to 1 in Dia. 13. White must play 2 to 6 to link up his group to the upper left. If White plays 11 instead of 6, Black will capture the white stones below by playing at 6. Take a look at this hypothetical continuation after Black 7. (Black could play the solid diagonal connection at 'a' instead of jumping to 25.) You will be able to see that Black is leading by over ten points on the board.



Dia. 13

To go back to the game, what is the aim of Black 1 in the figure?

Kobayashi: 'I made the snap judgment that White would play 2 in answer to Black 1 in *Dia. 14*. In this case, White must play 4 and 6 when Black ataris at 3 in order to live. After that, Black will capture two white stones with Black 7. I guess I was too optimistic.'



Dia. 14

'Compare *Dia. 13* with actual game. The territory that White gets on the bottom left corner and the top left in the game almost disappears in *Dia. 13*. Black's territory in *Dia. 13* is also much greater. I think everybody would choose *Dia. 13*.'

Now Black was losing. When Black enclosed the center by playing 13 and 23, Kobayashi optimistically believed that he had a slight lead. However, Rin's technique cut down on this lead. White 14 and 16 were timely moves. Since capturing the black stone is big, Black cannot omit 17.

White 32, 34, and 40 were good moves, and white took a tangible lead by limiting black's territory. However, an incredible trap was waiting for White. White 46 was the worst possible move: Black 47 decreased White's liberties. As a result, White could not save his stones unconditionally when Black played 51.

Kobayashi: 'If White had not played 46, Black would have lost by 2.5 or 3.5 points. I suspect White 46 was an alluring trap. Since the position was not difficult, Rin seemed to have been tempted by an evil spirit. Still, Black's win was not yet certain.'

Figure 6 (152–200) and 7 (201–261). Rin is a great player.

Kobayashi: 'I don't know how many points White lost through the ko at 60. But Rin's true losing move seemed to be White 78, ending the ko. If White plays 79 instead of 78, the situation is hard to evaluate because it would be difficult to choose the best ko threats. The game would probably be decided by a half a point. Black's win was decided when he captured the three white stones with 79 and 89. Rin is truly a great player. This was brought home to me again in the games we played in this match. It left me completely exhausted.'

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Kido, December, 1994. Translated by Okuma Osamu)




Figure 6 (152–200)

Ko: 61, 64, 70, 73, 76




Figure 7 (201–261)

61: connects (at 54)



The moment of triumph. Kobayashi Koichi lets out a sigh of relief after defending his Meijin title for the sixth year in a row.

'I couldn't afford to lose.'

The Meijin title match is over. Quite a few people thought that Kobayashi might lose the title, so his defending the title with four straight wins was totally unexpected. After the fourth game I was able to have a long conversation with Kobayashi about this title match.

Kobayashi: 'Before a big title match begins, every player aims at four straight wins. So this title match turned out exactly as I had hoped. However, I didn't deserve it to go so well. I was satisfied with my bold play. I did not give way an inch in difficult situations. Sometimes I even made overplays to push myself on.'

Kobayashi told me after the title match that 'My defiant attitude was responsible for this good result.' The word he used for 'defiant attitude' was *hirakinaori*, which would normally be used by the lower-ranked player. Kobayashi seemed driven into a corner. He had lost three title matches this year (Kisei, Judan and Gosei) and he was determined not to lose another. As he tersely put it, 'I couldn't afford to lose.'

Kobayashi: 'I don't mean to be rude, but Rin is no longer at his peak. I am younger than Rin, so if I lost to him it would be proof that the world of go has made no progress. Some

go fans have told me that if foreign-born go professionals got all of the big-three titles, they would become discouraged. However, that is the last thing that crossed my mind.'

I think that after Kobayashi lost the Kisei title, he has been concentrating on getting all three of the big titles. For that reason, he had to hold on to the Meijin title. His next goal is to challenge for the Kisei title, then return to the Honinbo league. As of this writing he is right on course.

Kobayashi: 'I do my utmost to win every game, just like Kato. But I'm not as young as I used to be. I have to choose my targets carefully. The big-three titles differ from the others because of their importance and the fatigue you suffer from after the two-day games. You said that I am "right on course" in my quest for these titles. You may be right. When I played against Rin in the semi-finals of the Kisei tournament while the Meijin title match was in progress, I put everything I had into it, so it was quite tiring.'

I wanted to hear his opinion about the emergence of four promising young players: Yuki Satoshi, Ryu Shikun, Yamada Kimio, and Morita Michihiro. Their rapid progress is remarkable. I asked Kobayashi: Do you think these players will become a threat to you and

Cho in the near future?

Kobayashi: 'I played against both Yamada and Ryu in the Tengen tournament. They've become stronger. It's not only these two players, but others from this group of players in their early 20's who have become stronger. If the group of players a few years older, like Yoda Norimoto and Komatsu Hideki, don't watch out, they are likely to be overtaken by this younger group. However, it is hard to say what their results will be in the future. Up to now [playing lower-ranked opponents], winning hasn't been so difficult. It's how they do from now on, against stronger opponents, that counts. If they don't break through this bar-

rier, they won't win a place at the top.

'Then there is the generation of Rin and Otake before me. In the last five years in the Meijin title match, these are the only two players who challenged me. To be honest, I think that I will still be playing against them again in the near future. The generation from Kato to Cho is in the same position as me. And there is a younger generation just behind us. If we drop our guard, we will surely lose to them. That's the danger we face: the threat of a new generation taking over. I hope that you can give me some praise as a respectable professional player (smiling).'

Akiyama: 'Of course!'

Important Stones and Useless Stones

by Takagi Shoichi

In this series I hope to illustrate the difference between important and useless stones. It is intended for players ranging in strength from 10-kyu to shodan. Perhaps I should have chosen a more elegant title for this series, something like 'Ashes and Diamonds', but since it is only for a go magazine, such a title might sound a bit pompous.

Although the theme is a common one, I promise that this will be a unique series.




Figure 1. Three patterns

Look at Figure 1. You may think it looks strange and wonder what I am trying to illustrate. Briefly, when stones are in contact with each other, they can be classified into these three patterns.

(1) The two black stones have been completely separated. The three white stones are like an insulator running between them and no electric current can pass. I call this the 'Separated Pattern'.


(2) The two black and white stones are cross-cutting each other. Both the black and white stones are unstable. I call this the 'Cross-cut Pattern'.

(3) Two white and two black stones are attached in parallel. They are like flying geese in flight formation. I am not sure what to call it, but tentatively let's call it the 'Flight-Formation Pattern'.

In games, positions are always more complicated than this, but they can all be reduced to these three basic patterns. We will study Patterns 2 and 3 in the next installment, but to begin with, let's look at Pattern 1.

I think of useless stones as ones that are separated as in (1) in Figure 1. It should be commonsense to a go player that such stones

should never try to escape. It is important that you learn how to clearly distinguish the difference between useless and important stones. This is what I will try to do in this installment. Don't think that this is trivial problem.




Dia. 1 (An important stone)

This is an easy example. Do you think that the marked black stone is useless or important? All go players should immediately understand that it is an important stone.

Dia. 2 (Escape immediately)

This stone has to be rescued immediately, so Black plays 1. If White 2, Black plays 3. Black could also play at 'a' instead of 3. Either way is good. The point is that by rescuing this important stone, White's two groups become unstable. This is a big positional gain for Black.

Let's look at a slightly different position.




Dia. 3 (A useless stone)

Is the marked black stone an important or a useless stone? This stone is completely separated from its three allies in the corner. There is, so to speak, no electric current passing between them. Therefore, it is completely useless. You should pay no attention to it.

Dia. 4 (Can't escape, but . . .)

Here we have added the marked white stone to the position in *Dia. 1*. The marked black stone is useless in the sense that it cannot escape, but there are peeps at 'a' and 'b' that Black may use as ko threats or ladder blocks, so it still has some electrical charge.

Therefore, it cannot be regarded as completely useless. Let's call it a semi-important stone. I hope that you can see the big difference between *Dias. 3* and *4*.




Dia. 5 (Completely insulated)

The marked black stone is absolutely useless. Of course it can escape, but being completely separated from its four allies it makes no sense to escape.

Dia. 6 (Cutting)

This position is different. The marked stone is in danger, but you must remember that it is separating the two white groups. It is an important stone containing a full charge of electricity. But you must think about how this stone is going to move. Even if White plays 'a', the marked stone is still important. Black can make use of it with a peep, or get sente with a hane and connection on the second line.



Dia. 7 (Territory in compensation)


If White pushes through with 1, Black complies by playing 2 to 6. There is no problem with these moves. But you must understand that the two black stones have become useless. In compensation for this, Black has gotten territory, so he has no complaint.

Dia. 8 (Semi-important stones)


The two marked black stones can't escape, but they still can be utilized. Therefore, they are semi-important. Being able to play 1 in sente, as well as 3 and 5, is satisfying to Black.

Black is more than happy to let these stones be captured.

When you look at it this way, neither the number of stones in a group nor their liberties has any relation to whether or not they are important.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Dia. 9 (Getting fatter and fatter)

Does Black 1 show great strength? Some players think that they are showing great fighting strength by escaping this way. But the black stones are getting bigger and becoming a greater burden. Perhaps they will escape, but this should not worry White. With every move, his position will keep improving.

I have seen weak players play Black 1 at 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'. Such plays show them as only rank beginners.

Dia. 10 (Out of the question)

By playing 1, some players might think that they are helping the two black stones. This move is not as bad as the ones in Dia. 9, but playing it is still out of the question. Black needs many moves to rescue these useless stones, so White need not concern himself about them. He just takes the initiative elsewhere on the board, for example, White 2.


Dia. 11 (Losing a tempo)

In the same way, it is stupid to try to capture the two black stones with White 1. Such a move is almost the same as passing. Briefly put, 'Don't play near useless stones.' This rule applies to both sides. It is similar to the


proverb, 'Don't play near thickness.' Important stones should move, but useless stones should not, and neither side should play near them.

Dia. 12 (Semi-useless stones)

Even if you understand that useless stones should not move, you might have trouble judging this case. Is the marked white stone useless? It is not yet dead; a slight chance exists for escaping. A strong player who doesn't want to lose this stone might play White 1 to 5. His intention is to attack Black if he succeeds in escaping. However, White is in dire straits after Black 2 to 6. The marked white stone is semi-useless, and trying to help it is nonsense.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12


Dia. 13 (An example from a game)

Here is a position from a professional game. Is the marked black stone important or useless? The surrounding area is all white. Escaping is possible but seems difficult, so it can't be said to be a semi-useless stone. Still in the game, Black played 1 in Dia. 14.

Dia. 14 (An important stone)

Black played 1 even though White has a thick position. When I first saw this move, I couldn't understand how it could be good. In reply to 2, Black jumped to 3. So as to prevent Black from making a bamboo joint, White pushed through and cut with 4 and 6. Next, Black played 7 to 11, establishing a position in the middle of White's moyo, and White has no quick way to dislodge Black. For example,

Black can play 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', making good shape. Black also has a strong attack with 'd', White 'e', Black 'f'. Black has a lot of resources at his disposal.




Dia. 13

Helping your important stones means cutting your opponent's stones. I will be happy if

you understand this point. Therefore, Black 1 was a brilliant move.

This time I have just introduced you to the general concepts of important and useless stones. In the next installment I will go into the details instead of the general theory.

(Igo Club, January 1994. Translated by Yoshikawa Takeshiro)



Dia. 14


An Introduction to Tesuji: Answers

Problem 1. The *geta* tesuji


Geta is one of the most basic tesujis used in capturing stones. Every go player should be familiar with it. In English, *geta* is called a 'net' and this tesuji can be likened to casting a net in front of the prey in order to capture it.

Dia. 1 (The correct answer)

In this problem, Black first ataris at 1 to set the stage for a *geta* tesuji. If White tries to escape with 2, Black jumps ahead of him, casting his net, so to speak. Black is stopped in his tracks. No matter how White moves, his two stones will be captured.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (Failure)

Playing atari again with 3 after White 2 is too blunt. White extends to 4 and the chance to capture him has vanished.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 3 (Wrong direction)


Black 1 may look like a *geta* tesuji, but it is in the wrong direction. White links up to his stones on the right and the two black stones there are now dead.

Dia. 4 (The first application)


All of the black stones have a lot of liberties, so the *geta* of Black 1 is an effective tesuji.

Dia. 5 (White can't escape)

If White tries to escape with 1, Black blocks his path with 2. White's stones are clearly immobilized.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 6 (Failure)

The knight move of Black 1 is not a *geta* tesuji in this position. White can push and cut with 2 and 4, and it is now Black who will lose three stones.



Dia. 7

Dia. 7 (The second application)

Black 1 in this position is also a *geta* tesuji. If White tries to escape by playing 'a', Black blocks the escape route by playing 'b'. You should note that Black cannot capture White in a ladder starting with 'a' because the two black stones on the right are short of liberties.

Problem 2. Setting up a ladder


Every beginning go player knows that a ladder is an effective way to capture stones. Ladders are often sitting right under our noses, and all we have to do is to find a simple tesuji to set them up.

Dia. 1 (Failure)


Black 1 and 3 may superficially resemble a ladder, but after White 4 —

Dia. 2 (White escapes)

White will capture with 6, threatening to capture the marked black stone. Black's shape is in tatters, and it will be almost impossible for Black to defend his positions.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 3 (The correct answer)


To find the correct move, go back to the *geta* of the first problem. At first glance it may seem as if White can break through Black's net, but —

Dia. 4 (The squeeze)

If White ataris with 1, Black sacrifices a stone by blocking with 2 and squeezing with 4.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 5 (The ladder)


When White connects with 1, the ladder suddenly materializes with Black 2 and 4.

Dia. 6 (An application)

The presence of White's marked stone is quite annoying to Black. Yet he can eliminate this stone and save the two he has in the corner as well by setting up a ladder.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6


Dia. 7 (The tesuji)

Setting up ladders usually requires a squeezing operation. Black 1 and 3 squeeze White's three stones at the top.


Dia. 8 (The ladder)

After White connects with 1, Black's ladder

materializes with 2, 4, and 6, driving White into the marked black stone.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 9 (Defective moves)


Black 1 and 3 look like effective moves, but they do not utilize the marked black stone. Moreover —

Dia. 10 (Only two stones)

White will not connect at 'a' as Black might have expected. Instead, he will attach at 1 and capture the two black stones in the corner. Black can play 'a' in sente, but he only captures two stones. This is a big difference compared to Dia. 8.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Problem 3. Loose ladders

Ladders conjure up in the minds of most go players a series of continuous ataris until the stones are captured. There are ladders, however, in which none of the moves played are atari. These are called loose ladders. This problem is one of the standard examples of loose ladders.


Dia. 1 (The correct answer)

Black 1 and 3 are the moves that set up the loose ladder. After this, Black intends to restrict White's liberties to only two.


Dia. 2 (No escape)

If White plays 1, Black blocks with 2 and drives White to the edge with 4. Even though

there is a liberty at 'a', White has no way to save his stones.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 3 (Failure)


Blocking with Black 3 is too impatient. After 4, White will win the capturing race at the top because of his extra liberty at 'a'.

Dia. 4 (An application)

In this position, Black wants to capture the marked white stone. A simple ladder won't work because the white stones on the right act as a ladder block.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 5 (The tesuji)

The atari of Black 1, followed by a *geta* with 3 is the tesuji. Clearly it is out of the question for White to exchange 'a' for 'b', since Black would then be able to capture White in a simple ladder.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 6 (Captured)


If White tries to escape with 1 and 3, he is driven down Black's corridor to the edge of the board with the moves to Black 10.

(Let's Go, January 1994. Translated by Richard Bozulich)


Endgame-Calculation Exercises: Answers




8 points. Black's territory increases by 7 points. White's decreases by 1 point.




14 points. Black's territory increases by 4 points. White's decreases by 10.




4 points. Black's territory increases by 1 point. White's decreases by 3.




20 points. Black's territory increases by 11 points. White's decreases by 9.




10 points. Black's territory increases by 6 points. White's decreases by 4 points. Note the point marked 'x'.




10 points. Black's territory increases by 6 points. White's territory decreases by 4 points.




6 points. Black's territory increases by 1 point. White's territory decreases by 5 points.




12 points. Black's territory increases by 9 points. White's territory decreases by 3 points.




10 points. Black 1 makes a seki. White's territory decreases by 10 points.




8 points. Black's territory increases by 7 points. White's decreases by 1.




6 points. Black's territory increases by 4 points. White's decreases by 2.




14 points. Black's territory increases by 3 points. White's decreases by 11.




6 points. Black's territory increases by 5 points. White's decreases by 1 point.




10 points. Black's territory increases by 3 points. White's decreases by 7 points.




5 points. Black's territory increases by 5 points.




6 points. Black's territory increases by 5 points. White's decreases by 1 point.




4 points. Black's territory increases by 3 points. White's territory decreases by 1 point.



16 points. Black's territory increases by 10 points. White's territory decreases by 6 points.



6 points. Black's territory increases by 5 points. White's territory decreases by 1 point.




9 points. Black's territory increases by 8 points. White's decreases by 1 point. Note the points marked 'x'.

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
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
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